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I. INTRODUCTION

Criminal and habeas corpus cases constituted approximately one-third
of the docket for the U.S. Supreme Court's October Term 1999, which began on October 4, 1999 and ended on October 1, 2000. Of the twenty-seven
cases decided by full opinion, seventy percent were split decisions. In one
third of these split decisions the outcome was decided by a single vote. Over
three fourths of these close cases went against the defendant, with Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas constituting the majority. There were, nevertheless, some significant victories for
civil liberties, although these were more often victories which held the line,
preventing further erosion of established rights, than decisions which expanded the scope of constitutional protections. The Mirandawarnings were
preserved in Dickerson v. United States;' stops based on uncorroborated
anonymous tips were held to violate the Fourth Amendment in Florida v.
J.L.,' and an attempt to overturn Mincey v. Arizona and create a "crime
scene" exception to the warrant requirement was summarily dismissed in
Flippo v. West Virginia.4 In an important case with potentially "huge" ramifications, Apprendi v. New Jersey6 held a sentencing enhancement, which
causes a defendant's sentence to exceed the maximum which can be imposed
for the underlying offense, violates due process unless the factual basis for
the enhancement was found by a jury to be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Court also handed down a number of significant decisions in habeas cases. This included Williams v. Taylor,' where the court found that
counsel in a death penalty case was ineffective for failing to investigate and
present mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury. This marks the first time
that the Supreme Court has found a right to counsel violation under the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel established in Strickland v. Washington!8

1. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
2. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
3. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
4. 528 U.S. 11 (1999).
5. This characterization of Apprendi's significance was made by Justice Anthony Kennedy, Address at California Western School of Law Library Dedication (Sept. 12, 2000).
6. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
7. 529 U.S. 420 (2000).
8. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2000
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II. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Illinois v. Wardlow 9
In the first Fourth Amendment opinion of the new millennium, the
Court addressed the long-standing debate" regarding whether flight from a
police officer should constitute reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
justifying a Terry stop." The sight of a police cruiser rounding the comer at
night may be reassuring to most white, middle class citizens. However, in
some communities the glare of a police cruiser's spotlight is more often perceived as a prelude to harassment based upon racial profiling. 2 A majority of
jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that flight from police presence
alone is insufficient to justify a Terry stop." In Wardlow, the Supreme Court
similarly refrained from announcing a "bright line" rule that flight from police, standing alone, equals reasonable suspicion. However, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's five to four opinion can arguably be interpreted to create just
such a rule when the flight occurs in a location labeled a "high crime area."

9. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
10. In prior cases, the Supreme Court had declined to hold that flight was sufficient to
constitute reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621 (1991). In Hodari the defendant threw down drugs as he ran
from police. Instead of finding that defendant's flight constituted reasonable suspicion justifying a seizure, the Court instead found defendant had not been seized at the time he discarded
drugs because he had not submitted to the officer's show of authority. Nevertheless, Justice
Scalia, who authored the Court's opinion, could not refrain from quoting the well-known Biblical passage: "The wicked flee when no man pursueth," Proverbs 28:1. Id. at 629.
11. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Terry held that police may stop a person based
on reasonable suspicion that they are about to engage in violent criminal activity. The Court
later expanded this narrow exception to uphold temporary seizures in order to investigate nonviolent criminal activity and past offenses. See generally Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972) (narcotics possession); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (immigration); U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (wanted flyer).
12. See National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 191 F.R.D. 52
(1999); Brown v. City of Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1999) for recent examples of class
action suits alleging the existence of discriminatory police stop and frisk policies based upon
race or national origin. See also David A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When
Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked,69 IND. L.J. 659 (1994); Tracy Maclin, Terry v.
Ohio's FourthAmendment Legacy: Black Men and PoliceDiscretion, 72 ST.JoHN's L. REV.
1271 (1998); Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept., 13, 1999, at 30;
Jeffery Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, NEw YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, June 20, 1999, at 51;
David Kocieniewski & Robert Hanley, Racial Profiling was the Routine, New Jersey Finds,
NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at Al, col. 2; San Diego Police Department Vehicle Stop
Study, Year End Report: 2000, May 8, 2001 (Hispanic and Black/African American drivers
were more likely to be stopped and more likely to be searched in connection with a vehicle
stop than white or Asian drivers).
13. See generally State v. Tucker, 642 A. 2d 401 (N.J. 1994); State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d
359 (Neb. 1992); People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W. 2d 451 (Mich. 1985); People v. Aldridge, 674
P.2d 240 (Cal. 1984); People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272 (Colo. 1983); Watkins v. State, 420
A.2d 270 (Md. 1980).
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Sam Wardlow was convicted in Chicago of unlawful use of a weapon
by a felon. On appeal, his conviction was reversed by the Illinois Appellate
Court and that reversal was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court on the
grounds that the discovery of the weapon was the fruit of an illegal stop.'4
Officer Nolan, a member of the special operations section of the Chicago
Police Department, was one of eight officers traveling in a four-car caravan,
which was dispatched to investigate heavy narcotics trafficking. The officers expected to encounter a large number of people, including drug customers and lookouts.'5 Officer Nolan, dressed in uniform, was seated in the last
car of the caravan. He testified that when the caravan passed 4035 West Van
Buren, he saw defendant Wardlow standing next to a building holding an
opaque bag. Wardlow looked in the direction of the officers and fled. Nolan
pursued Wardlow and stopped him. During a pat down, Nolan squeezed the
bag Wardlow was carrying and felt a heavy, hard object in the shape of a
gun. The officer then opened the bag and discovered a .38 caliber handgun.'6
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a bare majority, reversed the Illinois
Supreme Court's determination that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion
to make the stop. The Chief Justice acknowledged that mere presence in an
area of "expected criminal activity," standing alone, does not amount to
"reasonable particularized suspicion." He declared, however, "officers are
not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location" in determining whether to investigate, and noted that in Adams v. Williams" the fact the
stop occurred in a "high crime area" was considered relevant.'" Given the
contextual backdrop of expected heavy narcotics trafficking, Wardlow's
"unprovoked" and "headlong" flight upon noticing the police officers thus
constituted reasonable suspicion that Wardlow was engaged in criminal activity.
Given the attention paid to the contextual background, the majority
opinion does appear to reject a per se rule that flight under all circumstances
creates reasonable suspicion for a stop. Justice Stevens, writing for Justices
14. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122.
15. Id. at 124.
16. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121-22. Certiorari was granted solely on the question of
whether the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The validity of the frisk of the bag, therefore, was not before the Court. Id. at 124 n.2. But see Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334
(holding that squeezing a passenger's carry-on luggage constitutes a search).
17. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
18. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 119. This attempt to turn a passing reference to high crime area
in Adams into precedent which gives elevated status to "high crime area" in determining reasonable suspicion seems a bit of a stretch. While it is true that reasonable suspicion is based
upon the totality of the circumstances, and thus the likelihood of criminal activity in an area
can be relevant, the issue in Adams was whether a tip (that a man sitting in a car had narcotics
and a gun) made by an undisclosed informant, was sufficiently reliable to establish reasonable
suspicion. The Court found that there was an indicia of reliability because the informant was
personally known to the officer and could have been charged with giving false information to
a police officer if the tip had been bogus. Id. at 147. It thus really made no difference in Adams whether the car was located in a high crime area or not.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2000
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Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer in dissent, takes special pains to make this clear
by echoing Chief Justice Rehnquist's earlier pronouncement in United States
v. Sokolow"9 that "[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion... is not readily, or
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules," but must be determined
by looking to "the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture.""0 Using
this "totality of the circumstances" framework, one can argue that Wardlow
narrowly holds only that flight from an area of expected imminent criminal
drug activity, by someone carrying an object that could be a gun or narcot21
ics, gives rise to reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot."
Indeed, Wardlow can be sharply contrasted with the more typical case of
flight from officers on routine patrol in a high crime area. In Wardlow, an
entire caravan of officers went into an area of expected ongoing narcotics
sales to make arrests and spotted a man holding an opaque bag (which could
have held a gun) loitering next to a building (a position from which he could
have served as a lookout). To hold that flight under these circumstances constitutes reasonable suspicion does not mean that flight from police under
other circumstances, where no imminent criminal activity is expected, likewise justifies the forcible stop of a fleeing citizen.
It is unlikely, however, that such a narrow, fact bound reading of Ward22 the Ninth Circuit
low will prevail. In United States v. Montero-Camargo,
upheld a stop of a Hispanic defendant, driving a car with Mexicali license
plates, who made a U-turn just after a sign indicating that a previously
closed Border Patrol checkpoint had been reopened. This 'flight from a
checkpoint' occurred on a highway in an isolated, uninhabited locale. The
location was nevertheless designated as a "high crime area" because "historically" it had been used for illegal activities.23 The Court of Appeals acknowledged the danger that unless it is "properly limited and factually
based" the term "high crime area" can "easily serve as a proxy for race or
ethnicity."' 4 The Court further cautioned:
We must be particularly careful to ensure that a "high crime area" factor is
not used with respect to entire neighborhoods or communities in which
members of minority groups regularly go about their daily business, but is
limited to specific, circumscribed locations where particular crimes occur
with unusual regularity.-'

19.
20.
(1989)).
mention
21.

490 U.S. 1 (1989).
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126-27 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8
While the majority opinion pays token reference to Sokolow, it curiously omits any
of the "totality of the circumstances" test.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.

22. 208 F.3d 1122 (9" Cir. 2000) (en bane).

23. See id. at 1139.
24. See id. at 1138.

25. See id
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss2/3
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Nevertheless, the determination of "high crime area" was made in Montero-Camargo solely upon the basis of "vague and undocumented" testimony of the Border Patrol officers based upon their past personal experiences. As the concurring justices in Montero-Camargo complained: "To
them [the majority] it's a high crime area because the officers say it's a high
crime area."
If the problematic definition of "high crime area" permits an everexpanding universe in which Wardlow will be applied, language from the
Chief Justice's opinion, lifted out of Wardlow's factual context, likewise
threatens to transform flight into a talisman of reasonable suspicion. As the
majority opinion notes, evasive behavior has always been recognized as a
"pertinent factor" in determining reasonable suspicion. Finding that
"[h]eadlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate act of evasion,"
the Chief Justice observed that such evasion, "while not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing is certainly suggestive of such."' Even if Wardlow is
confined to high crime areas, this inference makes it possible to argue that
Wardlow does in fact create a bright line rule: flight from police in a high
crime area equals reasonable suspicion. But drawing such a blanket inference from flight alone ignores the quite different realities that exist between
middle-class, white, suburban communities and low income, inner city, minority communities, where racial stereotyping and fear of police are part of
the landscape.
This darker side of Wardlow is brought into clearer focus by the majority's disapproval of the Illinois Supreme Court's reliance on Florida v.
Royer.28 In Royer, Justice White emphasized that while an officer may approach someone and pose questions without offending the Fourth Amendment, an individual has the right to ignore the police and go about his business:
The person approached... need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his
way.... He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable,
objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does
not, without more, furnish those grounds.29
Following Royer, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that flight at the
approach of a police officer "may simply reflect the exercise- 'at top speed'
of the person's constitutional right to 'move on' and ruled that "the exercise
26. See id. at 1143.
27. Wardlow, 528 U.S.

at 124. Some courts have found that merely walking away from a
group when police approach is not "headlong flight" and therefore have distinguished Wardlow. See State v. Warfield, 101 Wash. App 1052, (2000) (unpublished opinion) available at
2000 WL 1009035. But see generally Montero-Camargo,208 F.3d at 1122, where an apparently legal U-turn was treated as the equivalent of flight.
28. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
29. Id. at 498.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2000
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of this constitutional right may not itself provide the basis for more intrusive

police activity."3' The state court therefore held that flight from police could
justify a forcible stop "only when coupled with specific knowledge connect-

ing the person to involvement in criminal conduct."'" Rejecting this view,
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted: "But unprovoked flight is simply not a
mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not 'going about
one's business'; in fact, it is just the opposite." 32
The Chief Justice does not elaborate upon what would constitute "provoked" flight. It is clear, however, that the right to avoid interaction with police, so boldly asserted in Royer, has been substantially curtailed by Wardlow and must be exercised, if at all, with great restraint. Indeed, the scope of
the damage done by Wardlow to the Fourth Amendment right to be let alone
is seen clearly in recent lower court decisions such as United States v.
Stone."
In Stone, the defendant, a young black male, was observed by patrolling
officers from the Street Crime Unit, walking with an "awkward gait" at
12:25 a.m. in the Bronx. The officers were in plain clothes, traveling in an
unmarked car. After momentarily observing Stone walking on the sidewalk
as they drove by, the police turned their car around and followed him into a
parking lot because, in their experience, individuals carrying firearms often
walked unnaturally like Stone did. When they drove up alongside Stone, one
officer called out: " How are you doing? Police." Stone responded, "I am
just going home" and then fled. The officers chased Stone and grabbed him
as he tried to climb a fence. A gun was found in his right front pants pocket.
The district court found that "it is very likely that the officers' actions were
based initially on racial stereotyping." ' Although "troubled" by the likeli30. People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E. 2d 484, 487 (Ill. 1998), cert. granted, 526 U.S. 1097
(1999), rev'd, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
31. See id.

32. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.
33. 225 F. 3d 647 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion) availableat 20000 WL 1341455.
34. The trial court concluded:
[I]t seems likely that the initial effort to speak to the defendant, which resulted in
his decision to flee, was probably based on the fact that he was a relatively young
black male walking alone, late at night, in an area of the Bronx patrolled by the
Street Crime Unit-by definition a high-crime area. This conclusion is bolstered
by the officer's own testimony. Specifically, Detective Martin testified that when
Officer Denver first prompted him to look at the defendant, he could see nothing at
all that might arouse Officer Denver's suspicion that the defendant was engaged or
about to be engaged in criminal activity of any kind.
United States v. Stone, 73, F. Supp. 2d 441, 447 (1999). The trial court then noted that since
the record reflected that the defendant was illuminated only by street lighting, and Officer
Denver directed his fellow officer's attention toward defendant while he was still more than
fifty feet away from their moving car, race must have been the predominant reason the officer
found "something noteworthy about the defendant." Id. The trial court noted that while the
officer's actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment, "that does not mean that these actions
are necessarily free from further review, perhaps in the context of a civil action." id. at 448.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss2/3
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hood that race motivated the initial decision to approach the defendant, the
court ruled that the officer's subjective intentions were irrelevant to Fourth
Amendment analysis under Whren v. United States35 and denied defendant's
motion to suppress.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Wardlow, endorsed the
trial court's conclusion that since the area in which defendant was walking
was patrolled by the Street Crime Unit, it was "by definition a high crime
area." Observing that flight from such an area "alone might be sufficient,
under Wardlow, to justify... the seizure of Stone," the court found that the
added fact Stone walked with an awkward gait and, according to the officers,
repeatedly touched his right front pocket, removed any doubt about the lawfulness of both the stop and the frisk for weapons.36 Stone's argument that
his flight was provoked because he did not know the plainclothes officers
were police and feared a robbery attempt was rejected because the officers
claimed they identified themselves as police. Assuming that was so, the fact
that the officers confronted the defendant apparently was not considered
provocation, nor was this difference from Wardlow even noticed.
It is ironic that the district court judge who decided Stone is also the trial
judge in National Congressfor Puerto Rican Rights v. New York,37 which involves a class action, filed prior to Stone, alleging racial profiling by the
same Bronx Street Crimes Unit which approached Stone. In areas where it is
known or commonly believed that a person can become the subject of police
attention simply because of his race, it might be argued that flight from such
encounters may be the common response of even law abiding residents of
the minority community, especially the young. This, in turn, reveals that relying on "high crime area" as the predominant factor in elevating flight to
reasonable suspicion is seriously flawed. As Professor Margaret Raymond
has suggested, the character of a neighborhood should be considered in
evaluating reasonable suspicion only when the conduct observed is "behavior that is not common amongst law-abiding persons at the time and place
observed." 3
One is reminded of the knife-fighting scene in Leonard Bernstein's musical, Westside Story. After the fatal wound is inflicted, there is a dramatic
moment of hushed silence, then police sirens are heard in the background
and everyone who has gathered round to watch the fight flees into the darkness. Realistically, could a young Black or Hispanic resident feel safe in
choosing any option other than flight, if he had just witnessed that scene reThe trial court then referred defendant to the complaint filed by Plaintiff Richie Perez in National Congressfor Puerto Rican Rights v. New York, 191 F.R.D. 52 (1999), which alleges a

conspiracy to violate defendant's civil rights.
35. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
36. United States v. Stone, 225 F.3d 647 (2000) (unpublished opinion).

37. 191 F.R.D. 52 (1999).
38. Margaret Raymond, Considering the Characterof the Neighborhood in Evaluating
ReasonableSuspicion, 27 SEARCH & SEizuRE LAW REPORT, no. 2, at 12 (Feb. 2000).
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played on the streets of urban America today? Of course, flight from the
scene of a crime is suspicious and that is indeed all Wardlow really holds.
Yet Wardlow's language and the nebulous term "high crime area" threaten
to turn entire neighborhoods into crime scenes, where avoiding unwanted
contact with police is no longer an option. It may be argued that there should
be a duty on the part of law-abiding citizens to assist the police. But whatever the merits of that position, the debate on that issue should not take place
in ignorance of the role race plays in structuring the context in which that
duty arises.
B. Bond v. United States39
In this deceptively simple, but important case, the Court held that a law
enforcement officer's squeeze of a bus passenger's soft carry-on luggage
was a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.'
The defendant was traveling on a Greyhound bus from California to Little Rock, Arkansas when a Border Patrol Agent in Texas boarded the bus.
After he had determined that no illegal immigrant was on board, the Agent
squeezed the passengers' bags in the overhead luggage rack as he was leaving the bus. When he examined defendant's canvas bag he felt a brick-like
object, which turned out to be a brick of methamphetamine that had been
wrapped in duct tape and rolled in a pair of pants."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that the officer's physical manipulation of the bag was not a search. In a surprising seven to two opinion
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed."
The importance of this case stems from its rejection of the Govern43 and Florida v. Riley."
ment's argument, based upon Californiav. Ciraolo
In Ciraolo, the defendant grew marijuana in the privacy of his fenced back
yard. Despite the fact that the backyard constituted curtilege and thus had
Fourth Amendment protection from ground level observation, the Court held
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to visual
observation from an airplane traveling at 1000 feet, because "any member of
the public could have lawfully observed the defendant's property by flying46
overhead."'4 Therefore, under the test established in Katz v. United States,
such an observation by police was not a search.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

529 U.S. 334 (2000).
Id. at 334.
Id. at 334-37.
Id. at 339.
476 U.S. 207 (1986).

44. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
45. Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 213 (emphasis added).
46. 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss2/3
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In Riley, the court fragmented when attempting to apply Ciraoloto police observations of curtilege from a helicopter at 400 feet. Justice White, in
a plurality opinion announcing the judgment, adopted the "bright line" position that the Fourth Amendment does not extend protection to an area the
police can observe from a "lawful public vantage point." While the defendant lost in Riley, what is often forgotten is that Justice White could garner
only three additional votes for his position. Justice O'Connor, who concurred in the judgment, and the four Riley dissenters all agreed that it was
not the lawfulness of the vantage point that was determinative. Rather, in
their view, a citizen's Fourth Amendment protection was lost only if the
public used that vantage point with "sufficient regularity" that an expectation
of privacy was unreasonable.' Thus, a de facto majority of justices distinguished Ciraolo on the ground that while airplanes routinely flew overhead
as a matter of course, helicopter flights were another matter." Because Riley
established no precedent for adopting either the plurality's "any lawful public vantage point" test or Justice O'Connor's "routinely used" lawful public
vantage point test, the lower courts have been left in a quandary. '
In Bond, the Government relied on the Riley plurality position and the
quoted language from Ciraolo noted above. In a straightforward argument,
the Government claimed that because the defendant exposed his bag to the
public by placing it in the overhead luggage rack, members of the public
could have lawfully made the same discovery the officer did by pushing or
squeezing the bag to make room for their luggage. Because the defendant
had no reasonable expectation that the bag would be exempt from such
physical manipulation, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding tactile information so acquired. The fact that a fellow passenger acquired
this information inadvertently, while the officer's acquisition was purposeful, did not matter in Ciraolo and, the Government maintained, it should
therefore make no difference here.
Rejecting this view, the Court stressed the heightened privacy interest
travelers have in their carry-on luggage and held that while a passenger may
expect her bag to be handled, "[s]he does not expect that other passengers or
bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory
manner." The italicized language is of crucial importance because it would
appear to indicate that a majority of the Court has come around to Justice
O'Connor's position. While the Chief Justice's opinion does not make this
47. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 454. For a full discussion of Justice O'Connor's position see
Laurence A. Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist Court, 22 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 825, 861-73 (1989).
48. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment reached by the plurality only because
the defendant, in her view, had the burden of proof with respect to establishing a reasonable
expectation of privacy and failed to show that helicopter flights over his home were infrequent. Riley, 488 U.S. at 455.
49. See Pew v. Scorpio, 904 F. Supp. 18 (1995) (complaining about the "unhappy state
of Supreme Court precedent").
50. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39 (emphasis added).
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explicit, it is nevertheless the clear import of the decision. The fact that it
was theoretically possible that defendant's bag could have been physically
manipulated by any member of the public was not found to be controlling.
Rather it was the conclusion that such manipulation by the public was not
sufficiently routine (i.e., "a matter of course") that determined the outcome
of this application of the Katz test.
Forming an odd couple, Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia dissented. In
their view, the traveling scene is a "dog-eat-dog" world where passengers
cram, shove and push each others belongings in their attempts to stuff luggage into overhead bins. Thus they saw the type of manipulation engaged in
by the officer as "entirely foreseeable" and "substantially similar" to manipulation engaged in by the general public. Predicting that the majority's
decision would "lead to a constitutional jurisprudence of 'squeezes', which
would do little to protect privacy," Justice Breyer admonished passengers
who want protection from such public touching to get hard shell suitcases."'
The dissenting duo also took issue with the Chief Justice's weak attempt
to distinguish Ciraoloand Riley on the ground that they involved visual observations, which were less intrusive than physically invasive manipulation.
Here the dissent would seem to have a point. Katz abolished the distinction
between physical trespass and auditory intrusions in order to apply the
Fourth Amendment to wiretapping. Similarly, nothing should turn on a
purely categorical distinction between physical and visual intrusions. Indeed,
as the dissent points out, whether a physical intrusion (e.g. touching a bag) is
more intrusive than a visual intrusion (e.g., looking through a bedroom window) "necessarily depends on the particular circumstances."
If Bond indeed signals that a majority still adheres to Justice
O'Connor's formulation of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, it
will prove to be an important opinion. If, however, it signals a return to artificial distinctions based upon physical intrusiveness, it raises ominous warning signs that a storm is coming that could turn Katz on its head.

51. M at 342.
52. Id. The degree of intrusiveness is usually considered relevant to the quantum ofjustification needed to justify a search. Compare, for example, New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106
(1986)(holding that entry into a car to push aside papers laying next to the windshield in order
to expose the VIN was a search, but needed no individualized suspicion because it was a

deminimus intrusion) with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting a more intrusive pat
down search only on reasonable suspicion) and Payton v. United States, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)
(requiring warrant based upon probable cause to enter home to make routine felony arrest).
However, in Bond, the issue is whether there is a "search" in the first place. Under the majority's analysis, the degree of intrusiveness was properly considered relevant to whether or not
the defendant's expectation of privacy was reasonable. Obviously the more invasive a governmental intrusion is on a citizen's subjective expectation of privacy, the more likely the
citizen's expectation of privacy against that manner of intrusion will be considered reasonable. However, the dissent would appear to be correct in asserting that the degree of intrusiveness should not be determined by blind application of categories labeled "physical," "visual," or "auditory."
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C. Florida v. J.L.53

In another surprising victory for the Fourth Amendment, the Court held
that an anonymous tip that a person was carrying a gun was insufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion for a stop and frisk.'
Miami-Dade Police received an anonymous call that a young black male
wearing a plaid shirt was standing at a bus stop with a gun. No record was
made of the call and no further information was known about the unidentified caller. Two police officers went to the bus stop and observed three black
males "hanging out" there. One was wearing a plaid shirt. Although the officers observed no conduct that suggested any criminal activity, they nevertheless frisked all three individuals and found a gun on J.L. who was fifteen
years old. The Florida Supreme Court held the search was invalid and the
Supreme Court affirmed in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg.55
Previously, in Alabama v. White,5" the Court upheld a stop based upon
an anonymous tip. The unknown informant in that case predicted that a
woman carrying cocaine would travel from an apartment to a specific motel
in a car of a certain description at a specified timeY Distinguishing J.L.'s
case from White, Justice Ginsburg noted that here the tip did not contain
similar predictive information, which could be verified to provide a basis for
corroborating the informant's knowledge or credibility."
In response to the State's argument that the tipster did correctly predict
that a person in a plaid shirt would be standing at the bus stop, Justice Ginsburg explained that this was insufficient to show the informant had knowledge of criminal activity. Justice Ginsburg also declined the State's invitation to create a "firearms exception" to the Fourth Amendment, noting that it
would be difficult to confine such an exception to just firearms. More importantly, she observed, such an exception would permit anyone seeking to harass another to initiate a police search against a target simply by placing an
anonymous call."' Nevertheless, the opinion did not rule out that there might
be some circumstances in which the danger was so great (e.g., a bomb
threat) that an anonymous tip might be a permissible basis for intervention
without a showing of reliability. Similarly, the Court noted that a lower standard of reliability would be acceptable in order to do protective searches. in
schools, airports, and other areas where expectations of privacy are diminished.'

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

529 U.S. 266 (2000).
Id. at 268.
Id. at 268-69.
496 U.S. 325 (1990).
Id. at 329.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 271.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 273-74.
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D. Flippo v. West Virginia6
In Flippo, a unanimous Court rejected an attempt to create a "homicide
crime scene" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.62
The defendant and his wife were on vacation, spending the night in illfated Cabin 13, located in a state park. The defendant called 911 and reported that the couple had been attacked by an intruder. Police arrived to
find defendant sitting outside with injuries to his head and legs. Inside they
found the body of Mrs. Flippo who had died from wounds to the head. The
defendant was taken to the hospital and the area surrounding the cabin secured and sealed off. Around 5:30 a.m. police reentered the cabin to "process the crime scene." On a table they found an unlocked briefcase, which
they opened. Inside they discovered photographs that were later used in evidence against defendant to establish a motive for murdering his wife. No
warrant was ever obtained to search either the cabin or the briefcase.63
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the photographs,
declaring that it was "clearly within the law to conduct a thorough investigation and examination
of anything and everything found within the crime
'
scene area."
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court reiterated the general rule that a
"warrantless search is invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow and
well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement."' Without elaboration, the Court then reaffirmed Mincey v. Arizona," which had previously refused to create an exception for a murder crime scene.
While much could be said in favor of creating a "crime scene" exception to the warrant requirement when circumstances make it appear reasonable to do so, the Supreme Court has wisely avoided an open-ended reasonableness inquiry, based upon a balancing of interests. Because the
exclusionary rule places powerful hydraulic pressures upon lower courts to
expand any exception in order to admit evidence of wrongdoing, such an approach could lead to the rapid erosion of the warrant requirement for entry
into a home. Given the infrequency with which the Supreme Court can address a particular rule governing police practices, and considering the importance of personal security and privacy in the home, it is thus better to have a
rule which marks as clearly as possible the limits of an officer's unilateral
discretion to search a person's home.67
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

528 U.S. 11 (1999).
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.

66. 437 U.S. 385 (1978); see also Thompson v. Louisiana 469 U.S. 17 (1984) (per curiam).
67. The line is, of course, already muddy enough as a result of the consent doctrine,
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) and the exigent circumstances doctrine, Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) both of which permit warrantless entry into a home. The war-
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Ill. FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Dickerson v. United States"
The ink was barely dry on Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion in
Miranda v. Arizona 9 when Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501,0 which purported to overrule the decision. The statute, which applied only to federal
criminal prosecutions, declared "a confession shall be admissible in evidence
if it is voluntarily given."' In determining voluntariness, a trial court was instructed to take into consideration all of the circumstances surrounding the
giving of the statement including five specified factors, none of which was
controlling. ' The Supreme Court's required Miranda warnings were accordingly reduced to the status of mere factors to be considered in evaluating
voluntariness under a totality of the circumstances analysis. At the time it
was passed, and for more than thirty years thereafter, most commentators
and federal prosecutors thought the statute was an unconstitutional attempt

to legislatively override Miranda's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
and re-impose the old "voluntariness test" that Mirandahad expressly found
unworkable and inadequate to protect an accused's Fifth Amendment rights
during custodial interrogation.
Over the years, however, the Court's exceptions to the Miranda warnings in Michigan v. Tucker, 3 New York v. Quarles,4 and Oregon v. Elstad'
whittled away at the constitutional basis for the warnings. Moreover, the
right to counsel at custodial interrogations, which had been based on the
Sixth Amendment in Miranda," was subsequently undercut by Kirby v. Illinois." Kirby held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach
until adversary judicial proceedings had been commenced by indictment or
the filing of a formal charge. Because most interrogations take place before
formal charges are filed, the Miranda "rights" thus came to be seen as

rant requirement outside the home is of course riddled with exceptions. See Scalia, concurring
in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991).
68. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
69. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
70. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (West 2000).
71. Id.

72. One of the factors was "whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he
was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against
him." Id.
73. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
74. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
75. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
76. It is today often forgotten that Chief Justice Warren began his analysis in Miranda by
expressly reaffirming Escobedo v. Illinois 378 U.S. 478 (1964) which held that the Sixth
Amendment guaranteed the right to counsel at custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,442 (1966).
77. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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merely judge-made "prophylactic" safeguards rather than true constitutional
rights.
After Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion in Davis v. United States,"
scathingly attacked the Justice Department for failing to invoke section 3501
in federal criminal cases, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal took matters into its own hands. Contrary to the express wishes of
the Justice Department and without briefing in opposition, the panel held
two to one that admissions made by Charles Thomas Dickerson were admissible under section 3501, despite the trial court's finding that the FBI had
violated the Miranda decision by failing to give timely warnings." The U.S.
Supreme Court, in an opinion written by the Chief Justice, reversed, holding
that "Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in
effect overruled by an Act of Congress. . . ."" Only Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.
The facts of the case show how little Miranda is honored in actual practice, even by the FBI. Dickerson drove the getaway car in a bank robbery in
Arlington, Virginia. He used his own car, and his license plate was spotted
as he drove away from the bank. When ten FBI agents came to his apartment, he "voluntarily" accompanied them to the FBI's field office. No
Miranda warnings were given during Dickerson's initial interrogation, apparently on the assumption that Dickerson was not "in custody." While
agents interrogated Dickerson without success, a search warrant was sought
for his apartment where a large amount of cash had been seen on a bed.
When the agents succeeded in getting a search warrant, they informed
Dickerson they were about to search his apartment and it was at this point in
time that he gave an incriminating statement, which also implicated the principal in the robbery. While an FBI agent testified that he had given
Dickerson Miranda warnings shortly after obtaining the search warrant, the
trial court found this testimony was impeached by documentary evidence,
which showed that the Mirandarights form had not been signed until almost
an hour after the search warrant had been issued. The trial court therefore believed Dickerson's testimony that he had not been given warnings until after
he had given his statement and ruled that Dickerson's admissions were not
admissible."'
In reversing the Fourth Circuit's ruling that defendant's admissions
were rendered admissible by virtue of section 3501, the Chief Justice began
with the premise that "Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution."82 Turning then to the second premise-that Miranda announced a constitutional rule-the Chief Jus78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

512 U.S. 452 (1994).
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 672 (4 Cir. 1999).
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,432 (2000).
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 673.
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521

U.S. 507 (1997)).
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss2/3

16

Benner et al.: Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Review of United States

2001] U.S.

SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL AND HABEAS CORPUS DECISIONS

255

tice candidly acknowledged that there was language (much of it his own) in
some of the Court's Mirandajurisprudence that suggested otherwise. However, he reasoned, if Miranda was not constitutionally based, how could
Miranda apply to the states or form the basis for habeas relief? This ipse
dixit is hardly persuasive. Clearly, the Miranda Court thought it was announcing a rule based upon the Constitution, but that argument begs the
question as to whether Miranda itself is indeed legitimately based on the
Constitution. In the final analysis, when one cuts through the sophistry, the
Chief Justice's feeble defense of Miranda, which is contained in only five
paragraphs, is no defense at all.
The real premise underlying Miranda is that custodial interrogation violates the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled selfincrimination because the pressures inherent in the interrogation techniques
used by police constitute compulsion when employed against a person who
is powerless to escape from those pressures because he is held in custody.
Therefore, unless a suspect waives his or her right to be free from the compulsion of custodial interrogation, any questioning in that context is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. This premise is sound if one concludes, as the
Court did a century earlier in Bram v. United States3 that even mild questioning constitutes compulsion because a person who is arrested and accused
of a crime necessarily fears that if he remains silent when questioned, it will
be considered an admission of guilt and diminish his chances of being released."
The Miranda Court relied upon Brain, expressly stating that it was implementing the standard for compulsion established by that decision.' Brain,
of course, was decided in an era that showed great solicitude for the privilege against self-incrimination. The problem with Brain's premise today is
that the definition of "compulsion" under the Fifth Amendment has become
entwined with the concept of "voluntariness," which has changed in meaning over the course of a century. Today our conception of "voluntariness"
(and thus also compulsion) has been colored by the Court's development between 1936 and 1966 of the due process voluntariness doctrine-a much
rougher test than the refined concept of voluntariness employed by the Court
in Brain. The voluntariness doctrine spawned by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was used by the Court to decide the admissibility
of confessions in state cases at a time when the Fifth Amendment did not yet
apply to state criminal proceedings. Always in tension with the strictures of
federalism, this use of federal constitutional power to invalidate a state
criminal conviction developed as a compromise between the desire to pre-

83. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
84. id. at 562-63.
85. The Court stated: "In Bram, the Court reviewed the British and American history and
case law and set down the Fifth Amendment standard for compulsion which we implement
today ... "Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,461 (1966).
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vent abuses and yet still allow the states to retain control over their own procedures for administering criminal justice.
Using a "shocks the conscience" test as a rule of thumb, a due process
voluntariness analysis thus requires significantly more pressure to constitute
a violation than simply the fear generated by questioning after accusation
and arrest. Because not all custodial interrogations result in the kind of pressure that renders a statement involuntary under due process standards, and
because the Fifth Amendment, by its terms, requires actual compulsion (i.e.,
involuntariness) before there is a constitutional violation, the linking of
compulsion and due process voluntariness together causes Miranda to become unhinged from its major premise.
By failing to defend Miranda'score premise, as elaborated in Bram, the
Court in Dickerson was thus forced to claim that it has the power to protect
against actual unconstitutional pressure by prescribing rules that sweep
broader than the Fifth Amendment right itself. While such rule making is defensible in order to protect suspects in custody against unconstitutional pressures, nowhere does the Dickerson majority set forth a justification for its
exercise of such rule making power. It simply asserts that it has it. The dissent thus rightfully takes the majority to task, calling its opinion the
"Cheops' Pyramid.. .of judicial arrogance." 6
It remains to consider the actual holding of Dickerson. The issue, narrowly conceived, is whether section 3501 is unconstitutional. But Miranda
itself stated that it did not intend to throw a constitutional straightjacket over
the states and Congress. In a noteworthy passage the Miranda opinion emphasized that because it was "impossible to foresee all of the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be devised by the Congress
or the States" it would not say "that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsion of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted."8
So why was the "solution" adopted by Congress in section 3501 defective? The answer lies in the following passage from Miranda, which constitutes the core of both the Miranda and Dickerson holdings: "[U]nless we are
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused
persons of their right to silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following safeguards (i.e. Miranda warnings) must be observed." 8
Thus, the Dickerson Court concluded that although the "Constitution
does not require police to administer the particular Miranda warnings," 9 it
does require "procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to
remain silent and which will assure the suspect that the exercise of that right

86. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 465.
87. Miranda,384 U.S. at 467.
88. Id.

89. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440 n.6.
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will be honored." Because section 3501 does not require that an accused
must be told that he can remain silent and that the police will respect that
right, it is thus not "a procedure that is effective in securing Fifth Amendment rights." '
It will be immediately noted that this minimalistic view of Miranda
leaves the right to counsel warning vulnerable to future "solutions." It is true
that the Court found no justification for overruling Miranda, which it observed has become part of our national culture, but the Court left the door
ajar to finding a substitute for the right to counsel as a means of assuring that
the exercise of the right to be free from compulsion will be honored. For example, it might not be necessary to require that suspects be advised of the
right to consult an attorney if they made their waiver before a judge or perhaps some other neutral court official such as a court clerk.
What clearly remains a permanent part of our constitutional jurisprudence is the requirement that suspects must be warned of the existence of
their right not to have to talk to police. Dickerson itself put to rest the clamour over the alleged damage done to law enforcement by Miranda, noting
that "our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on
legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling that
unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case
in chief." As Professor Yale Kamisar has observed: "[T]he various exceptions imposed on Miranda have made it a much less formidable rule than the
Warren Court contemplated. But the significant numbers of 'exceptions'
Miranda has had to bear may be a principal reason why it is still alive....
B. United States v. Hubbell94
Defendant Hubbell entered into a plea bargain resulting in a sentence of
twenty-one months on charges of mail fraud and tax evasion in connection
with his billing practices as an attorney in an Arkansas law firm. As part of
his plea agreement, Hubbell agreed to provide the Independent Counsel Ken
Starr with "full, complete, accurate, and truthful information" in connection
with the investigation of President Clinton's investment in the Whitewater
Development Corporation."'
In subsequent proceedings against Hubbell regarding his alleged breach
of that plea agreement, Hubbell invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and was granted use and derivative use immunity
as provided under 18 U.S.C. § 6002. In response to a subpoena demanding
90. Id. at 442.
91. Id. at440n.6.
92.

d at 443-44.

93. Yale Kamisar, Your Sort-of Right to Remain Silent, NATIONAL L.J., July 17, 2000, at
A18.
94. 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
95. Id. at 30.
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"any and all documents reflecting, referring or relating to any direct or indirect source of money or other things of value received" Hubbell produced
over 13,000 pages of documents and records." These documents led to a
new ten count indictment against Hubbell for additional mail and wire fraud
charges and tax violations. The District Court dismissed the indictment on
the ground that the Independent Counsel had violated the immunity statute.
Because the prosecutor had discovered the unreported income and other
crimes from studying the documents produced in response to a subpoena that
the trial court characterized as "the quintessential fishing expedition," all
evidence the prosecutor would offer at trial was deemed derived either di' of Hubbell's
rectly or indirectly from the "testimonial aspects"98
act of producing those documents. 99
On appeal, the Government relied upon Fisherv. United States, 'maintaining "that the communicative aspect of [Hubbell's] act of producing ordinary business records [was] insufficiently 'testimonial' ... because the existence and possession of such records by any businessman [was] a 'foregone
conclusion.'"' In Fisher,the defendants had given records prepared by their
accountants to their attorneys."° The Court found that compulsory acquisition of voluntarily prepared records having incriminating content did not
amount to compulsion of testimony any more than did the similar acquisition
of incriminating physical evidence." The Court acknowledged, however,
that the act of producing such documents could have "communicative aspects" that might be testimonial.' As Professor LaFave has explained:
"[T]hree elements of production-acknowledgment of existence, acknowledgment of possession or control, and potential authentication by identification-are clearly compelled... but whether they are 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' ... depend[s] upon the 'facts and circumstances of particular
105
cases."
In Fisher,the Court found no basis for finding that the defendants' implicit admissions that the records existed were testimonial. Because the accountants had prepared the work papers in question in the ordinary course of
preparing the defendants' tax returns, the existence of such records was a

96. Id: at 31.
97. 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 1998).

98. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The Court held that the Fifth

Amendment protected only against compelled communications or testimony and therefore did
not apply to compelled production of physical evidence.
99. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 33-37.
100. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
101. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44 (2000).
102. Fisher,425 U.S. at 394.

103. Id. at 409-10.
104. Id. at 410.
105.

LAFAVE ET AL.,

CIMNAL PRocEDuRE § 8.13, at 467 (3' ed. 2000).
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"foregone conclusion" and defendants' act of production added "little or
nothing to the sum total of the Government's information."'"
In Hubbell, Justice Stevens, writing for all justices except the Chief Justice who dissented, distinguished Fisher on the ground that in Fisher the
Government knew of the existence and location of the accounting records,
while here the Government had no prior knowledge of either the existence or
the whereabouts of the 13,000+ pages produced by Hubbell. Justice Stevens
noted: "The Government cannot cure this deficiency through the overbroad
argument that a businessman such as respondent will always possess general
business and tax records that fall within the broad categories described in
this subpoena."'" Stevens concluded that it was "undeniable" that the production of these documents gave the Government a "lead to incriminating
evidence," observing that "the documents did not magically appear in the
prosecutor's office like 'manna from heaven."'"0 8 This advantage was not the
result of the mere non-testimonial act of production, because here it was
necessary for Hubbell "to make extensive use of 'the contents of his own
mind' in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in
the subpoena."'" Thus, Justice Stevens likened Hubbell's act in assembling
the documents to being forced to tell, "an inquisitor the combination to a0
wall safe, [rather than] being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox."
Because the testimonial aspect of Hubbell's act of producing the subpoenaed
documents was the "first step in a chain of evidence that led to this prosecution," Hubbell was therefore entitled to derivative use immunity under the
federal immunity statute.
IV. HABEAS CORPUS

A. Ramdass v. Angelone"'
In an ironic triumph of form over substance, a bare majority held that a
trial court could refuse to inform a capital sentencing jury that the defendant,
if given life, would in all probability never be released from prison."' Technically at the time of the penalty phase of his trial, the defendant was eligible
for parole."' He became ineligible for parole once judgment was entered on
a prior conviction. That event did not occur, however, until two and a half
weeks after his death penalty trial had been concluded.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Fisher,425 U.S. at 411.
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000).
Md2
at 42.
ld. at 43.
Id.
530 U.S. 156 (2000).
Idat 158.
Id. at 157.
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Bobby Lee Ramdass was convicted of the murder of a convenience
store clerk committed in the course of a robbery and was sentenced to death.
At the sentencing phase the prosecutor relied upon future dangerousness as
the aggravating circumstance justifying death, arguing that Ramdass would
continue to "[c]ommit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.""' Simmons v. South Carolina,' requires
that when future dangerousness of the defendant is at issue and the defendant
would be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if
the jury gave a life sentence, the jury must be so instructed. Despite the fact
that defendant's sentencing jury in Ramdass was confused about the possibility of parole and made an express request for clarification on this issue, no
such instruction was given." 6 The trial court reasoned that Ramdass was
technically still eligible for parole at that moment because judgment had not
yet been entered on the jury verdict convicting him of the prior offense that
would render him parole ineligible.
The events that led to this death sentence are as follows. During a Virginia crime spree throughout the month of August of 1992, the defendant
participated with others in robbing a Pizza Hut, a hotel, and a cab driver. On
August 30, defendant participated in an armed robbery of a Domino's Pizza
restaurant. On September 2, defendant, together with five other men robbed
a convenience store. During the robbery a clerk was killed. According to the
testimony of two accomplices, the defendant was responsible for the killing.
Defendant was arrested on September 11 and charged with the two pizza
restaurant robberies and the murder of the convenience store clerk."7 Four
months later he was brought to trial and convicted by a jury of armed robbery of the Pizza Hut on December 15, 1992. In quick succession he was
then brought to trial in a different county on the armed robbery of the Domino's Pizza and also brought to trial on the murder charge. The jury verdict
finding him guilty of the Domino's Pizza robbery was delivered on January
7, 1993. The penalty phase of the murder trial concluded on January 29 and
the jury recommended death.
Virginia's "three strikes" law precludes the possibility of parole for a
third felony offense if the three convictions involve murder, rape, or armed
robbery."' At the time of Ramdass' conviction for the murder of the convenience store clerk, he had been convicted and a judgment was entered on the
verdict for the Pizza Hut robbery. However, no judgment had been entered
on the verdict in the Domino's Pizza case. Under Virginia law a conviction

114.
115.
116.
117.
Ramdass
118.

Id. at 161 (referencing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.4(C) (1993)).
512 U.S. 154 (1994).
530 U.S. at 162.
Id. at 160; see also Ramdass v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 437 S.E.2d 566 (1993);
v. Angelone, 28 F. Supp. 2d 343 (1998).
VA. CODEANN. §§ 53.1-151(B1) (1993).
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could not be considered for three strikes purposes unless judgment had been
entered on the verdict."'
During the penalty phase of the murder trial, the prosecutor called witnesses to the uncharged robberies of the hotel clerk and the cab driver.' The
prosecutor also brought the Domino's Pizza robbery to the jury's attention
through cross-examination of the defendant. Both the prosecution and defense thus relied upon this offense. The prosecution used it to show defendant's propensity for violence. Defense counsel used it to establish that defendant would never be released if given a life sentence. Defense counsel
argued, without objection from the prosecution, that "Your sentence [of life
imprisonment] will insure that if he lives to be a hundred and twenty two, he
will spend
the rest of his life in prison.... Ramdass will never be out of
2

jail.' '

During deliberations, however, the jury was apparently confused about
whether defendant would ever be released from prison and sent a note to the
judge asking, "If the Defendant is given life, is there a possibility of parole at
some time before his natural death?."'2 The trial court responded, "You
should impose such punishment as you feel is justified under the evidence.... You are not to concern yourself with what may happen afterwards.' 2 3

On appeal the Virginia Supreme Court agreed that the trial judge had
applied settled Virginia law that parole ineligibility was irrelevant to a capital sentence. " Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certiorari and remanded the matter back to the state court
to reconsider in the light of Simmons v. South Carolina."
On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Simmons did not apply because Ramdass was technically not ineligible for parole at the time the
jury considered his sentence in the convenience store clerk killing.2 6 This resulted from a technicality: No judgment had yet been entered on the verdict
in the Domino's Pizza case. Ramdass' petition for certiorari in connection
with his direct appeal was denied and he subsequently sought federal habeas
relief which was granted by the district court only to be reversed by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
A plurality of the United States Supreme Court agreed that Simmons did
not apply. Justice Kennedy writing for Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and
119. Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 360 (1994).
120. Both of these crimes were committed with violence. The hotel clerk was pistolwhipped and the cab driver was shot in the head, but survived after a lengthy period of unconsciousness. Ramdass, 530 U.S. at 160.
121. Id.
122. l This is the same question which the jury asked in Simmons, 512 U.S. at 160.
123. Ramdass, 530 U.S. at 163.
124. l
125. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
126. Ramdass, 530 U.S. at 164.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist ruled that since judgment had not been entered on
the conviction for the prior offense it was possible that defendant could have
filed a post trial motion and overturned the conviction. Therefore, at the time
the jury posed its question to the judge about parole eligibility, it was not
conclusively established that defendant would become parole ineligible as a
result of the prior Domino's Pizza robbery conviction. The plurality distinguished Simmons on the grounds that there, the defendant was legally ineligible for parole at the time of sentencing, subject to the possibility a future
event (such as the overturning of a prior conviction by appeal or pardon)
could change that circumstance. 7 Here, the defendant was legally eligible
for parole at the time of sentencing, subject to a future event (entry of judgment) that would make him ineligible. By means of this formalistic appeal to
logic the plurality thus sidestepped the fact that there is a vast difference between the two future events in terms of the probability of their occurrence.
The likelihood in Simmons of a prior conviction being overturned was nil,
while the likelihood that judgment would be entered on Ramdass' prior conviction was a virtual certainty. Even if a motion for new trial had been filed,
such motions are rarely successful and their purpose is primarily to preserve
issues for appeal. In any event, judgment was in fact entered in the Domino's Pizza robbery conviction only two and half weeks after the conclusion
of the penalty phase in Ramdass' murder trial.'
It is difficult to understand the plurality's fixation on certainty. What is
certain is that the jury was confused about the possibility of parole and it
mattered enough for them to send a precise question to the judge seeking
clarification. Equally clear under Virginia law at the time was that anyone
convicted of murder was not eligible for parole until they had served twentyfive years. 9 Empirical research cited to the Court showed that over half
(67%) of the jurors surveyed were more likely to give a life sentence if they
knew this fact alone. 3 If the infliction of the death penalty is to be a reasoned moral choice among the competing alternatives of life and death, why
should not the trial court, when expressly asked, have been required to inform the jury of at least the facts which were certain?
Justice O'Connor, concurring, noted that if a judgment entered on the
verdict were a purely ministerial act, she would have agreed that Ramdass
was for all practical purposes ineligible for parole at that point. However,
127. Id.at 167.
128. Id. at 160.
129. Id. at 177.
130. Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, Deadly Errors:JurorMisperceptions
Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV.

211 (1987). The plurality went out of its way to reject this attempt to inform the court, stating:

"The poll is not a proper consideration in this Court. Mere citation of a law review to a court
does not suffice to introduce into evidence the truth of the hearsay or the so-called scientific
conclusions contained within it." Ramdass, 530 U.S. at 172. This statement represents only
the views of four justices, however. Justice O'Connor, who apparently agreed with the plurality's reasoning, did not join Justice Kennedy's opinion.
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under Virginia law the entry of judgment was not merely a ministerial act
because the defendant could file a motion for new trial prior to entry, which
could result in setting aside the jury verdict. Therefore, she agreed with the
plurality that this was not a case which was "contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of' Simmons, which is the standard required by the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 for reversal on habeas review."'
Justice Stevens, writing for Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented. Stevens accused the plurality of engaging in excessive formalism to
defeat the clear purpose of the decision in Simmons, which was to ensure
that a defendant could bring his parole ineligibility to the jury's attention
when the State argued future dangerousness. Justice Stevens noted, "when
the State seeks to show defendant's future dangerousness.., the fact that he
will never be released from prison will often be the only way that a violent
criminal can successfully rebut the State's case." 32 Stevens argued that there
was "acute unfairness" in allowing the state to use a recent conviction to
show future dangerousness, while denying the defendant the right to use the
same conviction to establish he would not be a danger because he would be
' Stevens also noted that in Simmons the defendant was
incarcerated for life. 33
in fact also technically eligible for parole at the time of sentencing because
under the law of that state only the parole board could determine eligibility.
Thus, at the time of sentencing, the defendant in Simmons was technically in
the same position as Ramdass.'"
Furthermore, Justice Stevens pointed out, Ramdass had not made a motion to set aside the verdict in the Domino's Pizza case and even if he had,
there was no indication from the record that any ground existed that would
have permitted the trial judge to set aside this conviction. Therefore, the plurality's attempt to distinguish Simmons on the ground that a verdict was
more uncertain than an entry of judgment was, on the facts of this case, "just
flat wrong."'35 The dissenters thus found that the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court was contrary to the decision in Simmons, or at the very least
was an unreasonable application of Simmons, and that therefore habeas relief
was appropriate.'"
The fact that a motion to set aside the Domino's Pizza verdict, even after judgment was entered, is allowed under Virginia law'37 and the recogni-

131. Ramdass, 530 U.S. at 179. The federal habeas corpus statute forbids relief unless
the state court's decision was "contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law .... (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1994 ed. Supp. III)).
132. Id. at 195. (quoting Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 U.S. at 177).
133. Ramdass, 530 U.S. at 182.
134. Id. at 186.
135. Id. at 190.
136. Id. at 208.
137. Id. at 188 (citing Virginia Supreme Court Rule 3A:15(b) (1999)).
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tion that any of the qualifying prior convictions in this case could be overturned on direct appeal, or post conviction proceedings, demonstrates not
only the flaw in the plurality's seeming obsession with certainty, but also a
fundamental weakness in Simmons itself. This is perhaps why the plurality
was so miserly about applying Simmons here. But considering the frequency
with which death sentences have been erroneously imposed 38 the Court's
passion for closing the door to any loophole which might result in the imposition of an erroneous life sentence seems misplaced. Especially egregious in
this case is the fact that three jurors, in post trial interviews, indicated that if
the jury had known that Ramdass would never have been released from
prison, they would have given him life instead of death. 39
In Furmanv. Georgia" a death sentence was invalidated because it was
"arbitrarily... wantonly... and freakishly imposed."'' One has only to review the lower court appellate decisions in this case to recognize that nothing has changed in the intervening three decades. The formalistic handling of
this case by the Supreme Court is made all the more troubling by the cursory
treatment by the Virginia Supreme Court of Ramdass's direct appeal which
in only eight pages summarily dismissed (often without discussion) numerous issues including denial of the appointment of expert assistance, denial of
appointment of an investigator, denial of discovery regarding polygraph
tests, including questions and answers, given to his accusing accomplices,
and improper restriction on cross-examination of those same accomplices. In
the end, however, Bobby Lee Ramdass was the victim of the speed and efficiency with which death cases are processed in America today. Had his penalty phase been continued just two and a half weeks, until after judgment
was entered on the conviction that did in fact make him parole ineligible, he
might have been given life.
B. Portuondo v. Agard'42
In this case, the Court held that a prosecutor may argue in summation
that the defendant has a unique opportunity to fabricate and tailor his testimony because the defendant testifies last, after having the opportunity to
hear all of the prosecution witnesses' testimony.
Agard and his alleged victim met in a bar. After a night of drinking,
they engaged in a variety of sexual activities together, which were entirely
138. See Ky Henderson, How Many Innocent Inmates are Executed? 24 HuM. RTS. 10,
American Bar Association (Fall 1997) (reporting that 17 death row inmates across the nation
had been found innocent during a four year period). See also Marshall J.Hartman & Stephen
L. Richards, The Illinois Death Penalty: What Went Wrong? 34 J.MARSHALL L. REv. 409
(2001).
139. Ramdass, 530 U.S. at 184.
140. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
141. Id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
142. 529 U.S. 61 (2000).
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consensual. Approximately a week later, they met again, consumed substantial amounts of intoxicants and drugs, and once again engaged in sexual activities, which defendant testified were consensual. The complainant testified
it was not consensual. Agard was convicted on one count of first-degree
sodomy and sentenced to a term of ten to twenty years.'43
On federal habeas review the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
this conviction, holding that the prosecutor's argument that Agard had a
unique opportunity to fabricate and tailor his testimony because he testified
after hearing the other witnesses testify, violated a defendant's right to be
present at his trial and confront his accusers.'" The United States Supreme
Court reversed, affirming Agard's conviction. Justice Scalia wrote the
Court's opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Breyer. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justice Souter.
The defendant relied primarily upon Griffin v. California'" to support
his position that the prosecutor's fabrication argument was improper. In
Griffin, the Court held that neither the prosecutor's argument to the jury, nor
the judge's jury instructions could suggest that defendant was guilty because
she failed to take the stand and testify. Such argument and instruction unduly
encumbered the privilege against self-incrimination because it imposes a
penalty on the defendant for exercising the right.'" Here, the defendant argued that he had a right to testify after the other witnesses testified. Indeed,
he must wait for the prosecution to present its case before he is permitted to
testify. Therefore, like the defendant in Griffin, he should not be, in effect,
punished for exercising that right.
Rejecting this attempt to extend Griffin, Justice Scalia began by noting
that defendants were historically disqualified from giving evidence themselves at trial. It was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century that the
prohibition ended.'4 Hence, there was no historical support for Agard's
proposition that he has a constitutional right to testify last.'4 The majority
held that Griffin only stands for the proposition that a prosecutor cannot urge
a jury to do something it is not permitted to do, namely, infer defendant's
guilt from his silence. 49 This is because a defendant's silence at trial is a
non-act that is too ambiguous for a fair inference of guilt to arise."'

143. Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696 (2d Cir. 1997). He was also convicted of several
minor weapons offenses. Id.
144. IM
145. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
146. Portuondo,529 U.S. at 69.
147. Id. at 66.
148. Would it not appear, then, that there is no historic support for the Griffin result?
149. Portuondo,529 U.S. at 67.
150. See id.
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Defendant also relied upon Doyle v. Ohio,1 ' which held that a defendant's silence, after receiving Miranda warnings, could not be used against
him. The Doyle rationale was based upon the fact that in light of the
Miranda warnings it was unfair to draw any conclusion from a defendant's
silence." Distinguishing Doyle, the Court pointed out that here no similar
assurances were made to the defendant. He was not told that no comment
would be made if he testified last.
The Court also rejected defendant's argument that Geders v. United
States supported his position. In Geders, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that the trial judge may not place an order on the
defendant restricting him from talking to his lawyer during an overnight recess. The judge's order was seen as imposing too heavy a burden on a defendant's right to assistance of counsel. However, Justice Scalia observed,
Geders did not involve credibility. The prosecutor in Geders was free to
cross-examine the defendant about any coaching he received during the
overnight recess, and thus was permitted to infer that the defendant had fabricated his testimony.' Hence, Geders was not applicable to the Agard
situation. 55 Having dismissed the defendant's precedents, the majority found
support for its position in Brooks v. Tennessee. 6 In Brooks, the Court held
unconstitutional a Tennessee statute that required a defendant to testify first
in the defense case or not at all. In dicta, however, the Court stated that the
prosecution was not overburdened by a defendant's testifying last in the defense's case because the prosecutor could present the fabrication argument to
the jury."
The majority also relied upon the Court's decision in Reagan v. United
States.5 ' In Reagan, the Court approved an instruction that the jury may consider the interest a criminal defendant has in the case when evaluating his
testimony. Essentially, Justice Scalia asserted, the prosecutor's argument in
Agard is the same as the Reagan argument.
Justice Stevens,, concurring in the judgment, and joined by Justice
Breyer, found that while that the prosecutor's argument impugned the defendant's right of confrontation, the error did not rise to the level of "fundamental unfairness" necessary to reverse the conviction.'59 Stevens, however,

151. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
152. It may be noteworthy that Justice Scalia comments, "[t]here might be reason to reconsider Doyle." Portuondo,529 U.S. at 74.
153. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
154. IM at 89-90.
155. Portuondo,529 U.S. at 69.
156. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
157. Portuondo,529 U.S. at 70.
158. 157 U.S. 301 (1895).
159. Portuondo,529 U.S. at 75.
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rejected the majority's implicit endorsement of such summations noting that
they demean the adversary process and the presumption of innocence."w
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, dissented."" She began her
opinion by noting that, "[t]he Court today transforms a defendant's presence
at trial from a Sixth Amendment right to an automatic burden on his
credibility."'6 " Justice Ginsburg was persuaded that Griffin and Doyle
required a reversal of Agard's conviction. She did not see Reagan, relied on
by Justice Scalia, as pertinent because that 1895 decision addressed a statute
that gave the defendant the right to testify in his own defense and was not
premised on the Constitution."
The Agard decision allows the structure of the order of proof to burden
the defendant who testifies at trial. However, in most jurisdictions the allegation of recent fabrication in the trial testimony of a witness may be rebutted
by evidence of the witness' prior out-of-court statement that is consistent
with the testimony of the witness. This suggests at least two approaches for a
defense lawyer representing a client who has made a prior statement consistent with his testimony. First, although such statements are usually not admissible until the prosecutor attacks the defendant's credibility on crossexamination, in light of the prosecutor's potential Agard closing argument to
the jury, defense counsel can argue that the defendant's prior consistent
statements should be admissible during counsel's direct examination of the
defendant. Although such a motion will likely be denied, it may discourage
or otherwise lay the foundation for later objecting to the prosecutor's use of
this tactic during closing argument. Second, if the prosecution does not
cross-examine the defendant about his presence during trial, the defense
counsel can move in limini to foreclose such an argument because the defen-

dant was not confronted with his "opportunity to fabricate." In any event, if
the prosecutor is permitted to embark on an Agard argument, objection can
be made in light of Justice Stevens' comments in Agard. If overruled, and no
opportunity has previously been given, the defense can urge the judge to reopen the evidence to allow the introduction of a defendant's prior consistent
statement. Support for the trial judge's interrupting final argument to reopen
evidence may be found in Geders."
C. United States v. Martinez-Salazar"
In Martinez-Salazar,the Court held that a defendant's right to peremptory challenges is not infringed simply because he used a peremptory chal-

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 82.
164. See Geders, 425 U.S. at 86-87.

165. 528 U.S. 304 (2000).
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lenge to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause.'" Defendant and a co-defendant were charged with narcotics and weapon offenses.
During jury selection, one prospective juror steadfastly maintained that he
would favor the prosecution and vote for the government's position if all
things were equal. Not even the trial judge's questioning could undermine
the juror's determination to favor a conviction. Defendant moved to exclude
the juror candidate for cause. The trial judge denied the motion, perhaps because at one point the prospective juror had said he would follow the judge's
instructions. Defendant used one of his peremptory challenges to exclude the
prospective juror.67 At the conclusion of jury selection, defendant and his
co-defendant had exhausted their ten allowable peremptory challenges.'
They had not asked for any additional peremptory challenges to make up for
the one lost in removing the biased juror, nor did they ask that any other juror be excused for cause. The trial judge read the names of all the selected
jurors aloud and asked if the defense or the prosecution had objections to
any of the seated jurors. Defendant's attorney answered, "none from us."'"
Defendant was convicted, and on appeal, argued that he was denied the
full compliment of ten peremptory challenges authorized by law because he
had to use one of his peremptory challenges on a person who should have
been excluded for cause. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and reversed Defendant's conviction, remanding for a new trial. 7
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed and affirmed defendant's conviction. The Court concluded that defendant had not been denied any constitutional right because the juror he objected to was excused in any event by defendant's use of his peremptory challenge. In addition, defendant had not
been denied any right conferred by statute or rule because he had not asked
for any additional challenges, had not attempted to excuse any other juror for
cause, and had expressed no objections to any of the jurors who decided the
7
case. '
Justice Ginsburg authored the Court's opinion. 7 1 She agreed that if defendant had not used his peremptory challenge, and the contested juror had
actually sat for the trial, there may have been error. 73 The trial judge's failure to excuse the juror for cause would be of constitutional importance because the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury would have been violated. However, she noted, if defendant had a peremptory challenge available
for excusing the juror, it is hardly likely that a majority of the Court would

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 317.
Id. at 304.
FED. R. CPiM. P. 24(b).
Martinez-Salazar,528 U.S. at 309.
146 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1999).
See Martinez-Salazar,528 U.S. at 309.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 316.
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reverse the conviction if defendant could have excused the juror but failed to
do so.'"4
The Court observed that the right to have peremptory challenges, while
an old and venerable rule, which is valuable in assuring a fair and impartial
jury, is not a right imbedded in the Federal Constitution.'" What is constitutionally protected, is the right of a defendant to a jury which is fair and impartial. Having peremptory challenges available is very helpful in achieving
that end, but not essential. Defendant did not claim that an unfair jury had
convicted him. The Court viewed as inconsequential the fact that the defendant might have exercised a peremptory challenge on one of the seated jurors if he had not used one to remove a candidate that should have been excused for cause.' 6
Defendant's failure to ask for additional challenges and his failure to
seek to have any other juror excused after the ten peremptory challenges
were exhausted contributed to his unsuccessful argument. Even so, it does
not follow that had defendant requested an additional challenge or challenged a juror who was not excused after he had used ten challenges, that a
reversal would follow. The Court would likely call the error harmless, so
long as the defense could not point to a juror,77 actually empanelled, who
should have been excused for cause but was not.
Justice Souter's brief concurrence is worthy of note. He pointed out that
because defendant did not request additional challenges, this case "does not
present the issue whether it is reversible error to refuse to afford a defendant
a peremptory challenge beyond the maximum otherwise allowed, when he
has used a peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous denial of a challenge
for cause..."11I71
D. Weeks v. Angelone "9
In this case, the Court held that the presumption that a jury has read and
understood its instructions from the trial court overrides objective evidence
demonstrating jury confusion regarding the applicable law."' The Court
found that taken as a whole, the jury instructions were constitutionally adequate regarding the penalty phase of a death penalty case.'8 ' However, the

174. Id. at313.
175. Id. at311.
176. Id at 314.
177. See id. at313.
178. Id. at 783; see Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987) (holding in a capital case
where a judge erroneously excused a juror for cause at the request of the prosecution, the
jury's sentence of death must be vacated); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
179. 528 U.S. 225 (2000).
180. Id. at 234-37.
181. Id. at 234.
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jurors apparently focused on only one of the instructions, which even the
majority conceded, was indeed ambiguous and confusing standing alone."'
Weeks was convicted of capital murder,' 3 and the jury imposed the sentence of death." The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. '"
Weeks' petition for habeas corpus relief was dismissed and the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed." 6 The Supreme Court also affirmed, upholding the death sentence."' The Chief Justice wrote the Court's
opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas."' Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer. Justice Souter joined in all but Part I of Stevens' opinion." 9
Weeks stole an automobile."' Several weeks after the theft, while
Weeks was a passenger in the stolen car, the car was stopped by a police officer.' 9' Weeks shot the officer six times with hollow point bullets.' Arrested the day after the killing, Weeks admitted to the crime and indicated
that he was contemplating suicide because of it."3 While in jail, Weeks also
wrote4 a letter to a jail officer in which he expressed his sorrow for the killing.
At the sentencing phase of Week's trial, the prosecution relied on two
aggravating factors, each of which alone would support a death sentence: (1)
defendant was a "continuing serious threat to society" because of his propensity to commit violent crime, and (2) defendant's conduct was "outrageously wanton, vile, horrible, or inhuman, in that it involved.., aggravated
battery"" "to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the
act of murder." '9 Jury instruction number two stated, in pertinent part, "If
you find.., that the Commonwealth has proved.., either of the two alternatives ....
then you may fix the punishment.. .of death, or if you believe
from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you should
fix the punishment... at imprisonment for life....'9'
Other instructions advised the jury that, although they accepted one or
both of the aggravating factors as present, they were to consider all of the
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 230-31.
Id. at231.

186. Id.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 227.

191. Id.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id. at229n.1.

197. Id.
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evidence in deciding whether to impose death or the alternative life sentence.'98 The instruction, titled "Evidence In Mitigation," correctly explained
the definition of mitigation and how such evidence may result in a sentence
of life99 in prison despite the existence of one or both of the aggravating factors.'
After deliberating for approximately four and one half hours, the jury
sent the following question to the judge: "If we believe [defendant] is guilty
of at least 1 of the alternatives, then is it our duty.. .to issue the death penalty? Or must we decide (even though he is guilty of one of the alternatives)
whether or not to issue the death penalty, or... the life sentence? What is
the rule?. .. "'
The trial judge answered the question by simply referring the jurors
back to the ambiguous instruction number two, set out above, without further explanation."' He did not direct the jurors to other explanatory instructions that correctly defined the role of mitigation. The defense objected, asking that the judge advise the jurors that even upon finding one or both of the
aggravating factors present, they still could impose a life sentence 2° The
trial judge refused the request.'
After the judge had responded to the jury, more than two hours passed
before the jury returned a verdict of death.0" The verdict specifically found
that the second alternative aggravating factor (i.e., "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman," conduct involving aggravated battery) was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 According to the notes of the court reporter, as the jurors were polled on their sentencing decision, a majority of
them were crying.'
Weeks argued that the jury misunderstood that the mitigating evidence
could be used to justify a life sentence even though the jury found that the
second aggravating factor was present. The jury's confusion was evidenced by its questions to the judge, which asked exclusively about the ambiguous instruction. The judge failed to give a clear answer to the jury's
question.' Instead, he exacerbated their confusion by directing attention to a
single instruction which did not explain that mitigation factors could nullify

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id. at 232 n.2.
Id at 229.
Id.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 248 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. 238 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the death penalty, even if the second aggravating factor was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.21
The defense argued that therefore the jurors were led to believe that the
mitigation evidence addressed only the first aggravating ground, namely the
defendant's continuing threat to society.2 ' Prior to this incident defendant
had been a well-behaved student and star athlete who stayed with his girlfriend when she became pregnant and helped raise their child." These mitigating circumstances the defense argued played no further role in the sentencing decision, however, because of the juror's mistaken belief that
mitigation did not apply once the jurors accepted the second aggravating factor. 13 Weeks argued that with respect to that aggravating circumstance, the
sentence of death was mandatory in the minds of the jurors."4 The judge's
response should have specifically advised the jurors that mitigation must be
considered if the jury found either of the aggravating factors present.2 "
In a five to four decision, the jury's verdict of death was affirmed.2" 6 The
majority conceded that instruction number two, standing alone, was ambiguous and inadequate.2"7 But in other instructions, the jurors were advised that
mitigation may serve as a basis for a sentence less than death even when aggravation was present.2"' The majority held that it is presumed that jurors
read and understood all of the instructions.2 9 Furthermore, the arguments of
counsel to the jury made it clear that the jurors were to consider mitigation
although they also were convinced that one or more aggravating factors was
present in deciding what sentence to impose."
Dissenting, Justice Stevens argued that the question from the jurors
clearly illustrated their confusion regarding the role of mitigation.221 The
judge's answer to their question only increased the likelihood that the jurors
would incorrectly ignore mitigation once the second aggravating factor was
accepted.2" Thus, the jurors likely believed that a sentence of death was
mandatory if they found the aggravating circumstance existed.223 The fact
that most of the jurors were in tears as they were polled after their verdict,

210. Id. at 228-29.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 248 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 248-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 241-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

216. Id. at231.

217. Id. at 228-29.
218. Id. at 232 n.2.

219. Id. at 234.
220. Id. at 234-36.

221. Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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illustrated that the jurors, in all likelihood, would not have imposed death if
they had understood that death was not mandatory."'
The dissent further argued that all the defendant need establish is the
"reasonable likelihood" that the jury applied its instructions in a Way that
foreclosed consideration of the mitigating evidence, once aggravating circumstances'' were found, and that the record discloses such a "reasonable
likelihood."

E. Slack v. McDaniel226
In this case, the Supreme Court answered three questions concerning the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)227 which
transformed federal habeas review. First, the Court held that after the effective date of the AEDPA (April 24, 1996), an appeal taken from the dismissal
of a habeas corpus petition should be governed by the certificate of appealibility (COA) requirements of the AEDPA regardless of the date of the original petition." Second, the Court held that a COA should issue following the
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition on procedural grounds if the prisoner
demonstrates: "[1] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and, [2]
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling." 9 Third, the Court held that a subsequent
habeas petition, "filed after an initial petition was dismissed" for "failure to
exhaust state remedies," without adjudication on the merits, is not a "second
or successive" petition, which may be dismissed as an abuse of the writ.3"
In 1990, Antonio Slack was prosecuted in a Nevada state court and convicted of second-degree murder."' After an unsuccessful direct appeal,
Slack filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district court in
1991. Because he had failed to present all of his claims to Nevada state
courts, however, Slack was unable to continue in federal court 3 for failure
to comply with the exhaustion requirements of Rose v. Lundy.' Slack thus
moved for a stay and abeyance, so he could return to state court to exhaust

224. Id. at 248-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
226. 529 U.S. 473 (2000).
227. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) Pub. L. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1217 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266 (2001)).
228. Slack, 529 U.S. at 478.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (holding that a federal district court must dismiss a habeas petition if it contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims).
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his state remedies. 5 On February 19, 1992, the Federal District Court agreed
and ordered that Slack's petition be dismissed "without prejudice" and that
Slack be "granted leave to file an application to renew upon exhaustion of all
State remedies." ' 6
After exhausting his claims in state court, Slack filed a new habeas petition in federal court. 7 The District Court appointed counsel, who filed an
amended petition on December 24, 1997, containing fourteen claims for relief." In response, the government filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
two grounds: (1) the petition was "mixed" because some of the claims contained therein had not been presented to the state courts; and (2) under Ninth
Circuit precedent, adding claims to the current petition which were not
'
raised in to the 1991 habeas petition constituted "an abuse of the writ."239
On March 30, 1998, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss
Slack's petition.' The District Court found that Slack's 1995 petition constituted a "second or suc~essive petition." '' Therefore, invoking the abuse of
the writ doctrine, the court dismissed "with prejudice the claims that Slack
had not raised in [his] 1991 petition. ''u2 Finally, the court dismissed the remaining four claims on the grounds that one of the claims had not been
raised in the state courts, thus rendering the petition "mixed" and subject to
dismissal.243
On April 29, 1998, Slack filed a Notice of Appeal in the district court.2"
Following Circuit practice and the pre-AEDPA version of 28 U.S.C. § 2253,
the district court treated the pleading "as an application for a certificate of
probable cause (CPC)," which it denied on the grounds that "the appeal
' The
would raise no substantial issue."245
Court of Appeals also denied Slack
a CPC.' Slack appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, contending that his
1995 petition was not a "second or successive" petition and that he was "en24
titled to an appeal of the dismissal of his petition.""
Before concluding that Slack's 1995 petition was not a "second or successive" petition, Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority, resolved two preliminary issues." First, Justice Kennedy found that the post-AEDPA version

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Slack, 529 U.S. at 479.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 479-80.
Id. at 480.
Id.
Id.
IL
ld.
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of section 2253 should have controlled Slack's right to appeal. 49' Second,
Justice Kennedy articulated the showing Slack must make upon appeal from
the dismissal of a petition on procedural rather than substantive grounds.'
According to the pre-AEDPA version of section 2253, a prisoner can
only appeal from a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding if "the justice
or judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause" (CPC).' As the Court explained in Barefoot v.
E.telle, a prisoner must make "a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right" in order to obtain a CPC.' After April 24, 1996, the effective
date of the AEDPA, the nature of an appeal from a final habeas order
changed. The post-AEDPA version of section 2253 permits a prisoner to appeal only after obtaining a COA from a circuit justice or judge.' The revised statute also provides that, in order to obtain a COA, a prisoner must
make a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 5
Distinguishing the holding of Lindh v. Murphy, 6 Kennedy found that
the latter version of section 2253 should have controlled Slack's appeal. ' In
Lindh, the Court held that the post-AEDPA version of section 2254 (the section governing entitlement to relief) only applies to petitions that are filed in
the district court after the AEDPA's effective date." Section 2254 is thus
"directed to proceedings in the district court." 9 In contrast, Kennedy explained, "§ 2253 is directed to proceedings in the appellate courts."2' As a
result, the post-AEDPA version of section 2253 governs appellate court proceedings that were filed after the AEDPA's effective date, which includes
Slack's 1998 "Notice of Appeal."26 ' Slack, therefore, was required to seek a
COA in order to obtain review of the dismissal of his habeas petition.262
Because Slack filed a "Notice of Appeal," the court of appeals should
have treated it as an application for a COA. Noting that the showing required

to obtain a COA under the post-AEDPA version of section 2253 is essentially the same as that required to obtain a CPC under the pre-AEDPA version of section 2253, Kennedy explained that the meaning of "substantial
showing" is the same as that articulated in Barefoot: it "includes showing
249. Id. at 482.
250. Id. at 483-85.
251. 28 U.S.C. § 2253, Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 967.
252. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
253. Id. at 893.
254. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
255. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
256. 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
257. Slack, 529 U.S. at 481-82.
258. Lindh, 521 U.S. at 336.
259. Slack, 529 U.S. at 481.
260. Id.
261. It is interesting to note, however, that on appeal, pre-AEDPA law would govern the
rulings of the trial court. Id.
262. Id. at 482.
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that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that)
the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented
were 'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed fur,
the r. , 263
In a case in which the habeas petition was dismissed on the merits, then,
the petitioner must show that "reasonable jurists would find the district
court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." " In
Slack's case, however, the habeas petition was dismissed on procedural
grounds without the district court having reached the merits of his constitutional claims. 2 ' The Supreme Court therefore formulated the particular standard to be applied in cases like Slack's as follows: "a COA should issue
when. . jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states
a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." ' Justice Kennedy noted that this interpretation of the "substantial showing"
requirement was consistent with both Barefoot and the
267
AEDPA.
Determining whether a COA with respect to a procedural ruling should
be granted thus entails two inquiries.268 One is directed at the substantive
constitutional claim. 69 The other is directed at the procedural ruling."' As
Slack only addressed the procedural prong of the standard in the court below, the Supreme Court remanded the case to allow the parties to brief the
substantive prong, i.e. whether the requisite showing of a debatable constitutional error was met."
The Court, however, squarely addressed the procedural prong of the
standard. 72 First, Justice Kennedy explained that the District Court's characterization of Slack's 1995 petition as a "second or successive" habeas petition was incorrect. 273 Although Slack's 1995 petition followed an earlier petition, the initial 1991 petition was dismissed because of the exhaustion
requirement rather than on its merits. 4 Moreover, the question of whether
Slack's 1995 petition was second or successive should be assessed according
to pre-AEDPA law because his right to relief in the trial court was implicated, and Slack initiated these proceedings in the district court before the
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 483-84 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4).
Id. at 484.
id. at 489.
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 485-86.
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76
enactment of the AEDPA.275 Relying on its earlier decisions in Rose" and
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,2' the Court held that only if a petitioner, having presented a mixed petition, chose to proceed with just his exhausted
claims and deliberately declined to return to state court to pursue his unexhausted claims, would a subsequent petition raising those claims risk being
classified as "second or successive."2 ' Where, however, a mixed petition is
dismissed under Rose and petitioner chooses to return to state court to exhaust all of his claims, his subsequent habeas petition upon return the federal
court is to be treated as "any other first petition."2' 9
Reaffirming its "admonition that the complete exhaustion rule is not to
the Court also rejected the State's ar'trap the unwary pro se prisoner,
gument that the subsequent petition should be limited to the claims made in
the initial petition, which Justice Kennedy acknowledged is often uncounseled and hand-written." ' Instead, Justice Kennedy suggested that the courts
treat the initial mixed petition "as though it had not been filed, subject to
whatever conditions the court may have attached." '2u
Finally, the Court responded to the State's complaint that a "vexatious
litigant" could return to federal court upon exhaustion in state court and
again file a mixed petition, causing the whole "process to repeat itself' and
thereby delay collateral review.2"3 First, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the
states may prevent litigants from repeatedly returning to state court by imposing their own procedural bars.2 Second, where the AEDPA applies, it
may also limit such a tactic.2 Finally, Justice Kennedy observed that federal
courts have the ability, pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss
initial petitions with an instruction that the prisoner is only to bring exhausted claims in any subsequent petition to the court.286 In view of these
numerous mechanisms for avoiding vexatious litigation, the majority thus
rejected the state's claim that a gateway to abuse would be opened as a result
of the Court's interpretation of "second or successive. 287
Because his 1995 petition should not have been characterized as a "second or successive" habeas petition, Slack satisfied the requisite showing that
reasonable jurists could conclude that the district court's finding that there

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 486.
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
523 U.S. 637 (1998).
Slack, 529 U.S. at 486-87.
Id. at 487.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 489.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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was an abuse of the writ was wrong. 8 However, the Supreme Court remanded the case to determine whether Slack was otherwise entitled to a certificate of appealability on the substantive claims raised.289
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented." They believed that Slack's 1995
petition was rendered "second or successive" as a result of its inclusion of
" ' Justice Scalia first dismissed, as irrelevant, the
new, unexhausted claims.29
holding of Martinez-Villareal because that case did not involve exhaustion.2' He then found the theory on which the majority apparently thought
' By treating a mixed
the decision in Rose was based, to be "counterfactual."293
petition as if "[it] never existed," the majority, Justice Scalia complained, effectively ruled that no subsequent petition would qualify as "second or suc29 It would be much better, Scalia suggested, to interpret Rose as
cessive.""
holding that a later refiling was just a renewal of the claims in the first petition.29
Justice Scalia also discounted the Court's "mixed-petitions-don't-count
theory" because the language of the two cited cases did not support it. 96 In
Rose, the Court only provided that prisoners should be entitled to "exhaust
the remainder of their claims" after dismissal from federal court.' It did not
provide that prisoners may add new claims or return to federal court without
having exhausted all claims.298 Likewise, in Martinez-Villareal,the Court
only referred to treating "these claims" (i.e., previously dismissed, unexhausted claims) as if they were part of any other first petition."' It did not require treating "any and all claims" as if they were part of a first petition."°
Finally, Justice Scalia decried the burden that the majority's construction of "second or successive" will produce for the system?' Not only will
the State be required to expend time and resources to answer repeated petitions, Scalia argued, but the corrective measures suggested by the majority
will also impose an unnecessary burden on the district courts.m

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id.
Id at 489-90.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 491.
Id
lId
Id. at 492.
Id. at 491.
Id.
Id.
Id. at491-92
Id at 492.
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F. Edwards v. Carpenter 3
The intriguing constitutional question presented in this case is whether a

federal district court, on habeas review, can consider an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as "cause" for the procedural default of another con-

stitutional claim, when the ineffectiveness of assistance counsel claim itself

has been procedurally defaulted.3" Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of
six members of the Court, held that it cannot, unless the habeas prisoner can
also satisfy the "cause and prejudice" standard with respect to the procedurally defaulted ineffectiveness claim. 5
Carpenter was indicted for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery
in Ohio and pled guilty, while maintaining his innocence. A three-judge
panel accepted his plea based on the prosecution's recitation of the evidence

and after a mitigation hearing, sentenced him to life imprisonment with eligibility for parole after thirty years. On direct appeal, counsel for Carpenter
raised only one issue: that the evidence in mitigation justified eligibility for
parole after twenty years rather than thirty years. The Ohio Court of Appeals
affirmed the sentence, and Carpenter's counsel did not appeal to the Ohio
Supreme Court.?
After state post conviction relief was pursued without success, new
counsel for Carpenter filed an application to the Ohio Court of Appeals to
reopen his appeal on the grounds that his first appellate lawyer was constitu303. 529 U.S. 446 (2000).
304. Id. at 1589.
305. Like the exhaustion of state remedies doctrine, which requires federal claims to be
first presented to state courts, the procedural default doctrine and its accompanying "cause
and prejudice" standard are based upon principles of comity and federalism. A federal judge
cannot free a state prisoner held in custody in violation of the federal Constitution if, despite
the federal violation, there is an adequate and independent state ground justifying the prisoner's detention. One such "adequate and independent" state ground is procedural defaultthe failure of the prisoner to bring his federal claim in state court in accordance with proper
state procedures. As Justice Breyer points out in his concurring opinion in Carpenter,there
are three circumstances, however, where the state's assertion of such an independent ground
will not be deemed "adequate" to bar a federal claim: (1) where the refusal to consider the
claim will result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 750 (1991); (2) where the state procedural rule has not been "firmly established and
regularly followed." Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991); and (3) where the habeas
petitioner has good "cause" for failing to comply with state procedural rules and has been
"prejudiced" as a result. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). See Carpenter,529
U.S. at 456 (Breyer, J. concurring). When the asserted "cause" of a procedural default is the
alleged incompetence of counsel, the Court has further held that to constitute "cause" counsel's performance must be so defective that it amounts to a denial of petitioner's Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986). Thus, like a set of interlinked Russian dolls, a case like Carpenter's presents a series
of interconnected issues, each with its own analysis. For recent applications of the standard
established by Strickland v. Washington, for determining a violation of the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel, see Roe v. Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) and Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
306. Id at 448-49.
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tionally ineffective for failing to raise the claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty plea as well as the sentence. 3' This application
was made pursuant to a state rule of appellate procedure that permitted a defendant in a criminal case to apply to reopen a direct appeal on the ground of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, provided the application was
made within ninety days from the publication of the appellate judgment,
unless good cause was shown for filing later."
The effective date of Rule 26(b), however, was July 1, 1993, more than
two years after Carpenter's direct appeal was completed.3" The Ohio Court
of Appeals decided that Carpenter's time for filing began on the effective
date of Rule 26(b) and expired ninety days thereafter."' Since Carpenter's
application was filed more than a year after the effective date of the rule, the
state court dismissed the application, holding that he had failed to show good
cause for filing after the ninety-day period."
Carpenter then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S.
District Court, alleging that his first appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise the substantive claim that a factual basis was lacking for his
plea." 2 The District Court agreed appellate counsel had been ineffective under Stricklandv. Washington 3 and issued the writ, conditioned, however, on
the Ohio Court of Appeals reopening of the direct appeal.3" 4
On cross-appeals the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim served as "cause" to excuse the
initial procedural default for failure to raise the substantive claim even if the
ineffectiveness claim itself was time barred and thus procedurally defaulted.35 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Carpenter had exhausted the ineffectiveness claim in state court by presenting it in his application under rule
26(B) to reopen the direct appeal.3"
Before the United States Supreme Court, the state argued that a procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claim can only serve as
cause to satisfy the cause and prejudice requirements of another defaulted
claim, if it can also satisfy the cause and prejudice standard to excuse its
own default. Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Scalia agreed with
the state. He pointed out, that in order to qualify as an excuse for the default
of another claim, there were two requirements for the ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. First, the claim had to be presented to the state court. Sec307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at 449.
OHIo R. APP. P. 26(B).
529 U.S. at 449 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 449.
Id.
466 U.S. 668 (1984)
529 U.S. at449.
Id. at 450.
Id.
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ondly, the state court must have had a fair opportunity to consider the claim.
If that claim was procedurally defaulted, so that the state could not really
consider the claim, it should not automatically qualify as cause for some
other claim. Therefore, the ineffectiveness of counsel claim itself must satisfy the cause and prejudice test."'
The Supreme Court sent the matter back to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the defaulted ineffectiveness of counsel claim met the cause
and prejudice standard, or whether the Ohio Appellate Rule of Procedure,
which required such an application to be filed within ninety days, did not
qualify as an adequate and independent state ground. Only if the default was
excused for "cause and prejudice," or Ohio's procedure did not constitute an
"adequate and independent state ground," could the ineffectiveness of counsel claim then be used to excuse the default regarding the substantive
claim's
G. Roe v. Flores-Ortega

9

In Roe v. Flores-Ortegathe Court considered whether defense counsel's
failure to file a notice of appeal following a guilty plea, without consultation
or consent by the defendant, constitutes per se ineffective assistance of
counsel.' Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's "bright line" rule approach, the
Court held that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be determined
under a totality of the circumstances analysis--even where the claim is
based upon a court appointed lawyer's failure to consult with an indigent client.
In October 1993, the defendant, represented by his public defender and
assisted by a Spanish language interpreter, appeared in court and plead guilty
to second-degree murder." His plea comported with California law allowing
a plea of guilty when a defendant denies guilt, but agrees that the State has
enough evidence to convict."z In return, the prosecutor dismissed a use of a
deadly weapon enhancement and assault charges. 33 After he was sentenced
to a term of fifteen years to life, the trial court then advised the defendant
that he "may file an appeal within sixty days from today's date with the
court. '3" The notice of appeal, characterized as a "purely ministerial task,"
generally consists of a one-sentence document stating that the defendant
wishes to appeal from the judgment.3 z
317. Id.
318. Id. at 453-54.

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

528 U.S. 470 (2000).
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id.; see also People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595 (1970).
528 U.S. at 473.
Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 474.
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For the next ninety days, the defendant was in lockup undergoing
evaluation and was thereby prevented from communicating with his public
defender.326 Although his attorney had noted, "bring appeal papers" in her
case file, she had no further contact with defendant and did not file a notice
of appeal. 2 Four months later the defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal, which was rejected by the Superior Court clerk. 2 Defendant then filed
a state habeas corpus petition, challenging both his plea and sentence, claiming that his public defender had promised to file the notice of appeal. 29
After state post-conviction proceedings were unsuccessful, the defendant filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal.33 After an evidentiary hearing
before a magistrate-judge, the District Court denied relief.3 ' The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, citing its prior "bright line"
rule in United States v. SteaMs, 332 which held that the defendant must consent to counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal, remanded the matter back
to the District Court with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus and
the state appealed.333
Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority, began by acknowledging that
both California law3 34 and national standards promulgated by the American
Bar Association for the provision of indigent defense services 331 require, at a
minimum, that counsel consult with the defendant respecting his right to appeal. However, Justice O'Connor observed, under the standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel established by Strickland v. Washington,331 the Sixth Amendment only requires that counsel's conduct be
reasonable. "
Setting to one side cases in which counsel has received and ignored
clear instructions from a client to appeal, Justice O'Connor rejected any
bright line rule that would, in all cases, require counsel to consult with defendants concerning their right to appeal.338 Instead, Justice O'Connor held,
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 474-75.
332. 68 F.3d 328 (Ca. 1995).
333. 528 U.S. at 475-76.
334. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1240.1(a) (West Supp. 2000) (imposing a duty on trial
counsel to consult with the defendant about the possibility of an appeal).
335. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-8.2(a) (3d ed.
1993).
336. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
337. 528 U.S. at 481. To establish a constitutional violation under the Strickland two
pronged test, defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance "fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness" and (2) that defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984).

338. 528 U.S. at 479-80.
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"counsel has a constitutionally-imposed duty to consult with the defendant
when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want
to appeal (for example because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal),
or (2) that this particular defendant
reasonably demonstrated to counsel that
39
he was interested in appealing.
The determination of whether a duty to consult existed, moreover, is to
be made under a "totality of the circumstances" approach, taking into account all information counsel "knew or should have known." Relevant factors under the totality of circumstances analysis include, for example,
whether the defendant plead guilty, whether defendant received the sentence
he bargained for as part of the plea agreement, and (as expressly emphasized
in the above-quoted statement of the holding) whether there exists nonfrivolous grounds for an appeal. 4 ' Justice O'Connor noted that it was the
Court's expectation that in the vast majority of cases this inquiry would result in finding that counsel had a duty to at least confer with his or her client
regarding the right to appeal. 2 However, she refused to impose "detailed
rules" for counsel's conduct, noting that "the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation... [but rather] simply to ensure that criminal defendants
receive a fair trial. 34 3
Turning then to the second prong of the Strickland two-prong test, Justice O'Connor addressed the requirement that a defendant must show that he
was prejudiced by counsel's defective performance. Recognizing that the
Court has consistently held that a complete denial of counsel at a critical
stage of a judicial proceeding has mandated a presumption of prejudice because the adversary system has been rendered "presumptively unreliable,"
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that here the denial was "even more serious" where counsel's deficient performance resulted in the forfeiture of the
judicial proceeding itself.4' However, while prejudice will be presumed from
the forfeiture of a judicial proceeding, Justice O'Connor held that the defendant still has the burden of showing that counsel's ineffective assistance actually caused the forfeiture. '5 Thus, Justice O'Connor reformulated the test
for prejudice in this context to require that "a defendant must demonstrate
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure
to consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed."'
How an illiterate defendant who speaks no English and who has no understanding of the legal system is supposed to satisfy this burden is left un339. Id. at 480.
340. Id.

341. Id.
342. Id.

343. Id. at 481 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
344. Id. at 483.

345. Id. at 484.
346. Id.
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addressed. Justice O'Connor did, however, specifically reject the notion that
the defendant would have to specify in a habeas proceeding the specific
meritorious points that he would have raised on appeal if one were granted. 47
It is sufficient that he demonstrates that but for counsel's failure to file the
notice of appeal, he would have appealed." She then remanded the case
back to the District Court, because she was unable to determine from the record whether defense counsel had a duty to consult, whether she did in fact
consult with defendant, and, if not, whether defendant was prejudiced by that
failure.4 9 Given the undisputed facts of this case, this broad remand is telling. Defense counsel's own file notes stated "bring appeal papers.""
Clearly, this indigent defendant, who was handicapped by having to understand the proceedings through an interpreter, had expressed himself in perhaps the only way he could-by not admitting his guilt. Yet the fact this case
involved
an Alford plea was apparently not seen as significant by the
35'
Court.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's opinion, which in his view "makes clear that counsel does 'almost always' have a
constitutional duty to consult- with a defendant about an appeal after a
3' He emphasized
trial."
that the issue in this case concerned only the duty to
consult after a guilty plea.3 3
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, and Ginsburg, concurred with
Justice O'Connor's analysis of the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, but
dissented with respect to the performance prong analysis.3 ' In the dissenting
justices' view, it was unreasonable for a lawyer representing a client like the
defendant here to "walk away.., after sentencing without at the very least
acting affirmatively to ensure that the client understands the right to appeal. 3 5 'To condition the duty" to consult upon a determination whether "a
rational defendant would want to appeal" in effect, Justice Souter insightfully observed, "substitute[s] a harmless error rule for a showing of reasonable professional conduct.""35 There can be little doubt that this is what the
majority intended. As Justice O'Connor recognized, and repeatedly emphasized in examples, the existence of a nonfrivolous ground for appeal will sat-

347. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,486 (2000).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 474.
351. In North Carolinav. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) the Court upheld this type of plea,
whereby a defendant who maintains his innocence can nevertheless be convicted upon a plea
that waives his trial rights and admits that there is evidence sufficient to convict. See also
People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595 (1970).
352. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 488.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. ld. at 488-89.
356. Id at 492.
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isfy both the performance and prejudice prongs of the Strickland analysis.'
While Justice O'Connor expressly noted that this was not a necessary requirement, in practice, it may prove difficult for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to prevail in the absence of such a showing."'
As Justice Souter warned, this decision "erodes the principle that a decision about appeal is validly made only by a defendant with a fair sense of
what he is doing. '' 9 Observing that most defendants cannot rationally make
a decision about an appeal without the advice of counsel, Justice Souter
criticized the majority for countenancing convictions even when there has
been "a breakdown of the adversary system."3"
H. Terry Williams v. Taylor 6'
This landmark case marks the first time that the United States Supreme
Court, applying the two-pronged standard in Strickland v. Washington,362
found that a defense lawyer rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to investigate and present mitigation evidence at the sentencing hearing
in a death penalty case. The categories of evidence outlined in the Court's
analysis provide a useful blueprint for assessing claims of ineffectiveness at
sentencing. The decision is also important because it interpreted a critical
provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA),3" which operates to insulate state interpretations of federal constitutional law from federal habeas corpus review.
Defendant, Terry Williams, was found guilty of the murder of Harris
Stone. At the close of the sentencing hearing defense counsel told the jury:
I will admit too that it is very difficult to ask you to show mercy to a man
who maybe has not shown much mercy himself. I doubt very seriously
that he thought much about mercy when he was in Mr. Stone's bedroom
that night with him .... I doubt very seriously that he had mercy on his
mind when he took two cars that didn't belong to him. Admittedly, it is
very difficult to get us (sic) and ask that you give this man mercy when he
has shown so little of it himself. But I would ask that you would.36
Not surprisingly, the jury recommended death.
357. Id. at 486.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 493.

360. ld.
361. 529 U.S. 362 (2000) There were two Williams v. Taylor decisions, involving different individuals, decided during the term. Therefore the first name is added to avoid confusion.
362. 466 U.S. 688 (1984). Strickland created a two pronged test, which requires a defendant to show: (1) that counsel's performance "fell below.an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) that defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. Id. at 669.
363. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) Pub. L. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266).

364. 529 U.S. at 369 n.2.
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The victim was found dead in his home on Henry Street in Danville,
Virginia on November 3, 1985. 3" Finding no signs of struggle, officials initially attributed the death to blood alcohol poisoning. Six months later, however, the police received an unsigned letter from an inmate of the city jail
who confessed to "killing that man down on Henry Street" and several other
crimes.3 ' The letter was traced to Williams, and he subsequently gave a
statement to the police in which he admitted striking Stone in the chest and
taking three dollars from his wallet after Stone had refused to loan it to
him.367
Williams was convicted of robbery and capital murder. The State introduced two state-employed "expert" witnesses in aggravation who predicted
that Williams would pose a serious continuing threat to society. 368 The State
also produced evidence of ten other violent crimes that he had committed in
the past, including an assault on an elderly woman who was left in a
"vegetative state" and was not expected to recover.369 In mitigation, trial
counsel presented the defendant's mother, two neighbors (one of whom he
spotted in the courtroom and put on the stand without knowing exactly what
she would say), and a tape-recording of a statement by a psychiatrist saying
that Williams had removed the bullets from a gun in an earlier robbery so as
not to hurt anyone.37 The judge followed the recommendation of the jury
and imposed the death sentence.37'
In 1988, the defendant filed a state post conviction petition, alleging that
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate in preparation for the sentencing phase. Due to this failure a wealth of mitigation evidence that had
been readily available was never presented to the jury. For example, defense
counsel could have called correctional officers who were willing to testify
that Williams was not dangerous and had in fact received commendations
for helping to uncover a drug ring in prison. A prominent member of the
community, one who had met Williams in jail in connection with a prison
ministry program, had also phoned defense counsel, offering to testify on
Williams' behalf, but defense counsel never returned the phone call.
Most importantly, defense counsel failed to present any evidence relating to Williams' traumatic childhood. Documents prepared in connection
with Williams' juvenile commitment when he was eleven years old, after his
parents had been imprisoned for criminal neglect, revealed that he was "borderline mentally retarded" and had suffered repeated head injuries, which
could have resulted in organic mental impairment. 3 These documents also
365. Id. at 367.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

Il
Id. at 367-68.
Id. at 368-69.
Id. at 368.
ld. at 369.
ld. at 370.
Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss2/3

48

Benner et al.: Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Review of United States
2001] U.S.

SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL AND HABEAS CORPUS DECISIONS

287

dramatically described a history of continued mistreatment, abuse, and neglect."' Based on this evidence, Judge Ingram, who had presided over the
original trial and imposed the death sentence on Williams, concluded that
defense counsel was ineffective and that Williams had been prejudiced by
counsel's deficient performance because, in the trial judge's view, there was
a reasonable probability that had this evidence been presented, the jury
would have spared Williams' life. 7
The Virginia Supreme Court, assuming without deciding that counsel
was ineffective, nevertheless disagreed with the original trial judge that Williams had suffered sufficient prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test."' Adding an additional requirement to the prejudice analysis,
based upon its reading of Lockhart v. Fretwell, 6 the Virginia Supreme Court
found Williams had not shown that his sentencing hearing was "fundamentally unfair" and denied relief.377
Having exhausted his state remedies, Williams then filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.378 The District Court first addressed the
issue of counsel's ineffectiveness and catalogued five categories of mitigation not brought out by trial counsel: (1). evidence of Williams' background;
(2) evidence of physical abuse by his father; (3) testimony by correctional
officers that he adapted well to a structured environment and was not dangerous while in prison; (4) prominent character witnesses who would have
testified on his behalf; and (5) evidence of petitioner's borderline mental retardation.3

9

The federal district judge, like the state trial judge, found that defense
counsel's performance fell below the norm of reasonable performance in a
capital case. The judge then ruled that the Virginia Supreme Court had failed
to carefully read the record, leading it to an erroneous factual conclusion,
and had applied the wrong legal standard in determining prejudice by grafting an additional fundamental unfairness requirement to Strickland's outcome determination test.3 1 In order to vacate Williams' death sentence and
order a new sentencing hearing, however, the federal court had to comply
with the new requirements of the AEDPA,38' which significantly cut back the
power of federal courts on federal habeas review of state convictions.

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
110 Stat.

Id.
Id. at 371.
Id.
506 U.S. 364 (1993).
Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194, 199-200 (Va. 1997).
529 U.S. at 362.
Id. at 373 n.4.
Id. at 373.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. 104-132,
1214 (1996) (codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266).
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1. HistoricalBackground of the AEDPA
The AEDPA, passed by the 104th Congress, was the result of long agitation and attempts to reform habeas corpus relief. In order to understand the
implications of the new act, it is helpful to understand the unique role the
writ of habeas corpus has played in American history. Initially the writ was
viewed as a protection only against the abuse of power by the federal government. Accordingly, the Judiciary Act of 1789 made the writ available
only to federal prisoners and prohibited any inquiry by the federal courts into
the propriety of state custody.3"
By 1867, tracking concern for the protection of black citizens from
abuses by state governments in the aftermath of the Civil War, the reach of
the writ was extended to state prisoners as well by providing that federal
courts "shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where
any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution or of any treaty or law of the United States." '
Of course, since the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states at that
time,3" the impact of this extension of habeas corpus jurisdiction to state
prisoners did not reach full flower until the Warren Court era during the decade of 1960s. During that decade, the Warren Court incorporated most of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights and applied them to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment." These decisions, which transformed state criminal
procedure, responded to an increasing awareness that state courts were failing to protect racial minorities from abusive law enforcement practices at a
time when these groups were attempting to exercise their political rights and
participate in the democratic process." 6 Images on national television of police beating peaceful civil rights protestors, and the documentation of dragnet searches and coerced confessions obtained in back rooms of police stations, provided justification for federal intervention to protect basic
constitutional rights.3" 7
Many of these decisions, collectively known as the Criminal Law Revolution, were controversial.388 Because the Supreme Court could review only a
limited number of state criminal cases each term, the Court lacked an effec382. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat 73, (1789).
383. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28 § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
384. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
385. See generally BODENHAMER & ELY, THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA
(1993)
386. Id. at 138.
387. Id.
388. The controversy over Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) which ruled that evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in state cases, was overshadowed only by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) which mandated similar restrictions on the admissibility of confessions. See
Laurence A. Benner, Requiemfor Miranda:The Rehnquist Court's VoluntarinessDoctrine in
HistoricalPerspective, 67 WASH. U. L. Q. 59, 119 (1989).
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tive means of implementing its decisions in state courts. The Warren Court
thus turned to the writ of habeas corpus and made the writ (and thus each
federal district court) its agent for the enforcement of its new criminal procedure decisions. In 1963, the United States Supreme Court decided three
landmark cases, Fay v. Noia,3 9" Townsend v. Sain,3' 9 and Sanders v. United
States.39' In the aggregate, these cases cut through the procedural thicket previously shielding state court decisions and facilitated access to federal courts
to correct violations of the federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights. However, these Supreme Court decisions also affected the balance of power between state and federal government, with respect to control over the criminal
justice system, resulting in the balance of power shifting dramatically to the
federal judiciary.
Subsequently, both the Burger and Rehnquist Courts modified several
of these habeas decisions, moving in the direction of more deference to state
court decisions and making it harder for federal courts to effectively review
state court convictions." Spurred by rising crime rates, members of Congress were also concerned that the pendulum had swung too far in favor of
defendants' rights and wished to return the control of the administration of
criminal justice to the states. 93 Even so, few lawyers and judges expected the
sweeping changes wrought by the AEDPA in 1996. The new Act reduced
the time for filing habeas petitions to one year after the close of state court
proceedings and created many other barriers to federal review.39 '
For example, prior to the AEDPA, although factual determinations by
state court judges were presumed correct, determinations of federal law or
mixed questions of fact and law were reviewed de novo by the federal
court.39 After the AEDPA, not only was the presumption of correctness for
state factual determinations retained,396 but the power of a federal court to
conduct de novo review of questions of federal constitutional law or mixed
questions of law and fact was restricted. The controlling section of the
AEDPA at issue in the Williams case was 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect

389.
390.
391.
392.

372 U.S. 391 (1963).
372 U.S. 293 (1963).
373 U.S. 1 (1963).
See BODENHAMER & ELY, supranote 384, at 101.

393. Id. at 102.
394. See generally Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New
Federalism After The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REV.337 (1997).

395. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (holding that whether a suspect was
"in custody" for Miranda purposes was a mixed question of fact and law and thus entitled to
de novo review by the federal court).
396. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (1996).
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to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applicationof, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 39
The District Court, applying this provision, held that the Virginia Supreme Court had misapplied the Strickland test, a rule clearly established by
Supreme Court precedent, and therefore that its decision "was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law"
39
under section 2254(d)(1). 8
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the Virginia
Supreme Court's application of Strickland was not "unreasonable" as required by the AEDPA because it could not be said that all reasonable jurists
would disagree with it. 399 On appeal, the Supreme Court fragmented, requiring two separate opinions to resolve the case. Justice Stevens writing for Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, O'Connor, and Kennedy, delivered the opinion of the Court on the substantive issue, holding that counsel was
ineffective under Strickland.' However, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, delivered the
opinion of the Court regarding the AEDPA issue, finding that section
2254(d)(1) required a state court's decision to be both incorrect and unreasonable, when dealing with the application of facts to a correctly stated rule
of law."' This majority then split over the issue of reasonableness. Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy believed the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was
an unreasonable application of Strickland and thus joined Justice Stevens in
reversing Williams' death sentence.' Chief Justice Rehnquist, believing the
Virginia Supreme Court's decision was not unreasonable, filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justices Scalia
and Thomas. 3
2. The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Justice Stevens, delivering the opinion of the Court on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, noted under Strickland, that defendant:
397. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996) (emphasis added).
398. 529 U.S. at 374.
399. 163 F.3d 860 (4h Cir. 1998).

400.
401.
402.
403.

529 U.S. at 367.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 385-91.
laat416.
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must show counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness [and] that there was a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.4
Justice Stevens began his analysis of the performance prong of this test
by pointing out that trial counsel did not begin to prepare for the sentencing
phase until one week prior to trial.' Moreover, counsel failed to investigate
or uncover extensive records documenting Williams' "nightmarish" childhood, not because of a strategic decision, but because trial counsel thought
state law barred the use of such records. Had counsel investigated the matter,
they would have found, inter alia, that Williams' parents were imprisoned
for neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been severely and
repeatedly beaten by his father, and that Williams was borderline mentally
retarded and did not advance past the sixth grade. An investigation would
also have discovered that in the structured environment of prison, Williams
had earned a carpentry degree and had received commendations from officials for helping to uncover a prison drug ring.'
With respect to the prejudice prong, Justice Stevens viewed as significant the fact that the judge on state collateral review was the original trial
judge who had heard the case.' Justice Stevens concluded that there was a
reasonable probability this mitigating evidence would have changed the
jury's mind about sentencing Williams to death.' Justice Stevens concluded
that the state trial judge had correctly analyzed the ineffectiveness claim under Strickland while the Virginia Supreme Court had not.'
For Justice Stevens, since the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was
incorrect, it was therefore "contrary to or an unreasonable application of
Strickland within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 4 1 Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, while agreeing with Justice Stevens that Williams'
counsel was ineffective, disagreed with this interpretation of the AEDPA
provision.
3. The Scope of HabeasRelief UnderSection 2254(d)(1)
Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority, found that Justice Stevens
failed to give independent meaning to both the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application of' phrases in section 2254(d)(1). Applying a cardinal principle of statutory construction 'to give effect, wherever possible, to every
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Id. at 390-91 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).
Id. at 395.
Id.
at 396.
Id. at 396-97.
Id
Id.
at 398.
Id. at 399.
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clause and word of an enactment, she then bifurcated the statute into two
separate categories where habeas relief was permitted. This was necessary,
said Justice O'Connor, to effectuate the intent of Congress, which had
passed the AEDPA to reduce delay and bring finality to state court convictions by deliberately restricting the power of federal courts to order retrials
of state criminal cases via habeas review."'
Justice O'Connor then attempted to define the two categories in which
habeas relief could be granted. First, a federal court could grant relief when
the state court's decision was "contrary to" clearly established Supreme
Court precedent. The phrase "contrary to" meant "mutually opposed" or
"substantially different from the relevant precedent of this Court."4"' Thus
if
the state court applied the wrong legal rule, say, for example, a "preponderance of the evidence" test instead of Strickland's "reasonable probability '
test, in analyzing an ineffectiveness claim, the state court's decision would
be "contrary to" clearly established precedent, and a federal court could
grant relief.
Justice O'Connor then postulated a second category of cases: the "runof-the-mill" case where the correct legal rule has been identified, but the
federal court, in its judgment, believed that the state court had applied the
rule incorrectly to the facts of that particular case.413 Here, Justice O'Connor
declared that the "unreasonable application" clause of section 2254(d)(1)
should control because: "Although the state-court decision may be contrary
to the federal court's conception of how Strickland ought to be applied in
that particular
case, the decision is not "mutually opposed" to Strickland it414
self.
Thus, in a case where the correct rule of law has been incorrectly applied, the federal court, under the AEDPA, must also find that the state
court's application was "unreasonable." Using legislative history to support
this interpretation, Justice O'Connor cited the following remarks of Senator
Specter: "[U]nder the [AEDPA] deference will be owed to State courts' decisions on the application of Federal law to the facts. Unless it is unreasonable, a State court's decision applying the law to the facts will be upheld." 4"1
Justice O'Connor then muddied the waters considerably by postulating a
second kind of misapplication. The Fourth Circuit had held that the "unreasonable application" clause should also govern an incorrect extension or refusal to extend a legal principle to a new context.416 Suggesting only that this
holding "may perhaps be correct," Justice O'Connor admitted that an at411. Id. at 404-05.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 406.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 408 (citing 142 Cong. Rec. 7799 (1996) (remarks of Sen. Specter)). Justice
Scalia, while joining Justice O'Connor's opinion in all other respects, expressly disassociated
himself from this use of legislative history. Id. at 399.
416. Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 869-70 (4!h Cir. 1998).
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tempt to apply the "unreasonable application" clause to this nebulous category of cases did have "some problems of precision." With refreshing candor, Justice O'Connor recognized:
Just as it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a mixed question of law and
fact from a question of fact, it will often be difficult to identify separately
those state-court decisions that involve an unreasonable application of a
legal principle (or an unreasonable failure to apply a legal principle) to a
new context. Indeed, on the one hand, in some cases it will be hard to distinguish a decision involving an unreasonable extension of a legal principle from a decision involving an unreasonable application of law to facts.
On the other hand, in many of the same cases it will also be difficult to
distinguish a decision involving an unreasonable extension of a legal principle from a decision that "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached
by this Court on a question of law. 41
Retreating from this quagmire, Justice O'Connor saved this issue for
another day, concluding that it would be unnecessary in Williams to decide
how such "extension of legal principle" cases should be handled under section 2254(d)(1). With respect, it is submitted that such a retreat was neither
candid nor possible. As implicitly recognized in the above quoted passage,
extension of the "unreasonable application" clause to cases involving an extension of a legal principle, would swallow the very dichotomy Justice
O'Connor sought to create. Indeed all members of the Court agreed that the
Fourth Circuit had incorrectly extended a legal principle (fundamental un4 to create an addifairness), which it derived from Lockhart v. Fretwell
tional hurdle for a defendant to overcome when raising an ineffectiveness
claim."1 9 When it came time to apply her analysis to the facts of Williams,
Justice O'Connor treated that extension of the Lockhart principle as falling
within the "contrary to" category, which does not require a showing of unreasonableness.4'
417. Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 362, 408 (quoting her own earlier example of a case
which would be classified as falling within the "contrary to" category). Id. at 405.
418. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
419. Even Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, conceded that such an extension was "improper" but argued that the Virginia Supreme Court had not relied upon that principle, despite
the citation of Lockhart and several express references to the principle in the state court's
opinion. Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 417.
420. In Lockhart, defendant's death sentence had been based upon an aggravating circumstance (murder for pecuniary gain) which, at the time of his trial had been ruled unconstitutional by the Eighth Circuit. If defense counsel had brought this precedent to the trial court's
attention, the outcome would have obviously been different because presumably the aggravating circumstance would not have been used. However, the Supreme Court later held that the
use of this aggravating circumstance was permissible. Therefore, while defense counsel had
made an error which would have otherwise qualify for relief under both the performance and
prejudice prongs as set forth in Strickland, the error didn't deprive defendant of any actual
constitutional right. So when the case reached the Supreme Court on habeas review, the Court
held, in the special circumstances of that case, that there had been no prejudice because the
defendant had not been denied fundamental fairness. In Williams, Justice O'Connor held that
the Fourth Circuit's expansive attempt to extend a "fundamental fairness" requirement to all
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Justice O'Connor then turned to the definition of "unreasonable" for
purposes of section 2254(d)(1). Acknowledging that this too was a difficult
inquiry, she stressed that a federal court cannot issue a writ simply because it
concludes the state court applied federal law incorrectly or erroneously. The
erroneous application must be unreasonable. While declining to give any
further guidance, Justice O'Connor did make a point of expressly rejecting
the standard of reasonableness employed by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. That court had held that habeas corpus relief was prohibited
under section 2254(d)(1) unless the State Court "decided the question by interpreting or applying the relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable."' That test, as Justice Stevens pointed
out, would be so restrictive as to deny relief in all but the most outrageous
cases. Indeed it would require federal courts (including the United States
Supreme Court) to defer to state judges' interpretation of federal law in almost every case.4 " Agreeing, Justice O'Connor, speaking for the majority of
the Court, held that the Fourth Circuit's standard, that all reasonable jurists
would have to agree that the state court decision was unreasonable, was incorrect.4' The proper inquiry by the federal court, Justice O'Connor said,
should be whether the state court's application of clearly established federal
law was "objectively unreasonable." The "all reasonable jurists" test, according to Justice O'Connor would transform the inquiry into a subjective test.2 4
Applying her analysis to the Williams case, Justice O'Connor (and Justice Kennedy) found the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court to be an unreasonable application of Strickland. In Justice O'Connor's view, there was
a reasonable probability that the jury's sentence of death would have been
different, observing that as a consequence of defense counsel's failure to
adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence "his generic, unapologetic closing argument... provided the jury with no reasons to spare
petitioner's life."4'
The Virginia Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit had believed that
the evidence that Williams presented a future danger to society was overwhelming and thus outweighed the omitted mitigation evidence, especially
since Williams had set fire to his cell while awaiting trial and had admitted
to having visions of harming other inmates. ' However, Justice O'Connor
found that the Virginia Supreme Court failed to consider the "totality" of the
mitigation evidence."' This disagreement over the weight to be given the
ineffective assistance of counsel cases was "contrary to Strickland." Terry Williams, 529 U.S.
at 414.
421. Green v. French, 143 F.3d at 865.
422. Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 362, 377 (Stevens, J.).
423. Id. at 410.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 416.
426. Id. at 418-19.
427. Id. at 416. Justice O'Connor was being tactful. The Virginia Supreme Court charac-
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mitigation evidence was apparently enough to make the state-court decision
"unreasonable" as well as incorrect. Thus Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
joined with the Stevens' plurality in forming a majority for reversal of Williams' death sentence. However, had they found that the state court decision
was merely incorrect, under the AEDPA, the federal courts would have been
powerless to reverse this case, and Terry Williams would have been executed despite a determination by the original trial judge, a federal district
judge, and a majority of the members of the U._S. Supreme Court, that he
had been denied the effective representation to which he was entitled by the
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.
I. Michael Williams v. Taylor 28
This case modified the harshness of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), a provision
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).'4
This statutory provision ordinarily bars an evidentiary hearing on a claim in
federal court, if a habeas petitioner "failed" to develop a factual basis for the
claim in state court proceedings.
On February 27, 1993, Michael Williams and Jeffrey Cruse were
dropped off in front of a local store in rural Cumberland County, Virginia.
They intended to rob the employees and customers in the store, but found the
store had closed.'"° Undaunted, the pair proceeded to the home of the owners,
Mr. and Mrs. Keller, whom Williams knew.43' They ransacked the house and
murdered the Kellers. 32 After loading the valuables from the house into the
Kellers' Jeep, they drove to Fredericksburg, Virginia, where they sold some
of the property and set fire to the Jeep.433 Williams then fled to Florida. 34
Acting on a lead, police questioned Cruse. 35 Cruse obtained counsel and
entered into a plea bargain with the State. 4 6 The State agreed not to pursue

the death penalty against Cruse in exchange for his disclosure of the details
terized the mitigation evidence as follows: "At most, this evidence would have shown that
numerous people, mostly relatives, thought that [Williams] was nonviolent and could cope
very well in a structured environment." Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194,200 (1997). It is
thus clear from the Virginia Supreme Court's own summary of the mitigation evidence that it
had either not read the record carefully or had ignored entire aspects of it, especially regarding
defendant's history of abuse and mental condition.
428. 529 U.S. 420 (2000). There were two Williams v. Taylor decisions rendered by the
Supreme Court during the term. Therefore the first name is added to avoid confusion.
429. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) Pub. L. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996) codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266.
430. 529 U.S. at 424.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 425.
433. id. at 425-26.
434. Id. at 426.
435. Id.
436. Id.
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of the crime. '31 Cruse then told police about the murders, placing most of the
blame upon Williams. Cruse, however, neglected to tell the police that he
raped Mrs. Keller.43 When the State found out about the rape, it revoked the
plea bargain and charged Cruse with capital murder as well. 39
Nevertheless, at trial, Cruse was the State's main witness against Williams." Cruse testified that Williams raped Mrs. Keller and shot both victims several times to make sure they were dead."' The jury also heard the
circumstances of the proposed "plea agreement" between Cruse and the
State, which was subsequently withdrawn."2 Williams took the stand in his
own defense and testified that he shot Mr. Keller only once."3 He denied raping or shooting Mrs. Keller."4 The jury convicted Williams and recommended death, which was imposed by the trial judge." Thereafter, Cruse
pled guilty to capital murder of Mrs. Keller and first-degree murder of Mr.
Keller.4 However, he received a life sentence after the prosecution asked
the Court to spare his life because he testified against Williams." 7
After an unsuccessful direct appeal and state habeas proceedings, Williams filed for federal habeas corpus relief in the Eastern District of Virginia
on November 20, 1996, alleging juror bias and prosecutorial misconduct."8
He made three claims: (1) that the State violated Brady v. Maryland" by
failing to provide him with a confidential pre-trial psychiatric report on
Cruse, which suggested that Cruse had only vague memories of the night of
the murders because he was intoxicated with alcohol and marijuana at the
time, (2) that Bonnie Stinett, the foreperson of the jury, had falsely denied
during voir dire that she was related to any law enforcement agents who
might testify at trial when in fact she had been formerly married to Deputy
Sheriff Meinhard for seventeen years (Meinhard, who had interrogated
Cruse and investigated the crime scene was the State's lead-off witness at
trial), and (3) that Stinett also denied that any of the lawyers in the case had,
ever represented her or any member of her family privately, when in fact one
of the prosecuting attorneys, Woodson, had represented her in the divorce
proceedings against Meinhard.3 0

437. Id

438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id.
Id. at 426.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

445. Id. at 426-27.

446. Id. at 427.
447. Id.

448. Id.
449. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
450. Williams, 529 U.S. at 427.
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Initially, the District Court granted an evidentiary hearing on claims two
and three."' However, before the hearing could be held, the State applied for
an emergency stay and a petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition in
the Court of Appeals, arguing that the AEDPA barred such an evidentiary
hearing. 2 The provision at issue, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), provides, in pertinent part:
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State
court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the
claim unless the applicant shows that (A) The claim relies on -i) a new
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or ii) a factual
predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the ex-

ercise of due diligence; and (B) The facts underlying the claim would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense."53

The State argued that Williams had "failed to develop" his claims in
state court as required by the AEDPA, and therefore, no evidentiary hearing
could be held in federal court on these issues. 5" The Court of Appeals remanded the matter back to the District Court with instructions to apply the
new statute to Williams' request for an evidentiary hearing."55 The District
Court, on remand, held that Williams had failed to satisfy the requirements
of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), and therefore vacated its earlier order granting an
evidentiary hearing on claims two and three."56 The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court reversed in part.'
Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court, acknowledged at the
outset that Williams had not established a factual basis for his claims in state
crmift."45 In fact, he did not even raise these claims until he filed his federal
habeas corpus petition in the District Court."59 Moreover, Williams also conceded that he did not come within the narrow exception created for those
who can establish their innocence by clear and convincing evidence as required by section 2254(e)(2)(B).' ° The State argued that once it is established that a habeas petitioner "failed to develop" his claims in state court,
the statute does not permit a federal court to inquire further into the cause of

451. Id.
452. Id. at 427-28.
453. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

454. Williams, 529 U.S. at 428.
455. Id.

456. Id.
457. ld. at 428-29.

458. Id. at 429.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 430.
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that failure."' However, Williams argued that the "failed to develop" clause
must be read as meaning a lack of diligence in developing the claims in state
court."2 Justice Kennedy agreed with Williams stating:
To say a person has failed in a duty implies he did not take the necessary
steps to fulfill it.... In this sense, a person is not at fault when his diligent
efforts to perform an act are thwarted... by the conduct of another or by
happenstance. Fault lies, in those circumstances, either with the person
who interfered with the accomplishment of the act or with no one at all."4
Justice Kennedy illustrated the point by observing:
If the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) covers a request for an evidentiary
hearing on a claim which... remained undeveloped in state court, because.., the prosecution concealed the facts, a prisoner lacking clear and
convincing evidence of innocence could be barred from a hearing ori the
claim.... The 'failed to develop' clause does not bear this harsh reading,
which would attribute to Congress a purpose or design to bar evidentiary
hearings for diligent prisoners with meritorious claims
just because the
prosecution's conduct went undetected in state court. 4
Justice Kennedy then found that with respect to claims two and three,
Williams was not at fault for "failing to develop" the facts in state court."
Indeed, in state habeas proceedings, Williams' counsel had requested funds
for an investigator to "examine all circumstances relating to the empanelment of the jury and the jury's consideration of the case. ''4' The prosecution
opposed this motion and the Virginia Supreme Court denied it, thus depriving the defendant of the opportunity to develop this claim in state court.467
Similarly, there was no reason for defense counsel to suspect that the prosecutor had represented the juror on her divorce." It is true such information
was available in public records, but Justice Kennedy observed that, "we
should be surprised, to say the least, if a district court... were to hold that in
all cases diligent counsel must check public records containing personal information pertaining to each and every juror."'
With respect to the first claim, however, which charged the prosecutor
with a Brady violation for failing to provide him with the psychiatric report
on the State's chief witness Cruse, the Supreme Court held that defense
counsel was not diligent." There were sufficient references to this psychiat461. Id.

462. Id.
463. Id. at432.
464. Id. at 434-35.
465. Id. at 437.
466. Id. at 442.

467.
468.
469.
470.

Id.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id. at 449-50.
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ric report in the transcript of Cruse's sentencing hearing to inform defense
counsel of the existence of the report." Therefore, state habeas counsel
could have made an effort to obtain this report so that the favorable information in could be raised in the state habeas proceeding. Williams' state habeas
counsel did in fact write a letter to the prosecutor requesting "[a]ll reports of
physical and mental examinations, scientific tests, or experiments conducted
in connection with the investigation of the offense, including but not limited
to... [a]ll psychological tests... performed upon any prosecution witness
and all documents referring or relating to such tests."4"' Absent a court order,
however, the prosecutor refused, and defense counsel apparently did not pursue the matter further.473 Because he did not pursue the matter further, Williamis' defense counsel was not diligent, and therefore "failed to develop" the
basis for his claim in state court, triggering the application of section
2254(e)(2). Thus, an evidentiary hearing on that issue was barred by the
AEDPA.
Michael Williams v. Taylor is of tremendous importance to both trial
and appellate counsel. First, it is a unanimous opinion by the Court, which
itself carries great weight. Second, it makes it more difficult for the state to
deny defense discovery requests and then urge the application of the
AEDPA to block any further inquiry in federal court by way of an evidentiary hearing.
But Williams also sends a warning signal to defense counsel, highlighting the necessity to make a bonafide documented attempt to raise and investigate every claimed constitutional violation before a federal habeas case is
filed. The Court's conclusion that defense counsel's letter to the prosecutor
requesting copies of psychological reports was insufficient to show diligence, mandates that formal discovery motions must be filed and a court record made regarding all discovery requests. Requesting the prosecutor to
state on the record that the items sought do not exist would be one way to
guard against the AEDPA coming back to haunt a defendant who belatedly
uncovers a significant discovery violation.
V. RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION

A. Martinez v. Californiae74
In an opinion skeptical of the value of the right to self-representation,
the Court unanimously agreed that a state, which protects the right to make
pro se filings, can force a defendant, against his will, to accept representation on direct appeal by a court-appointed counsel. 73 In contrast to the right
471. Id. at 438-39.

472.
473.
474.
475.

d at 439.
Id.
528 U.S. 152 (2000).
Id.
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476 the Court
to self-representation at trial, established in Farettav. California,
found that there is no constitutional right to represent oneself on appeal."
Martinez, who worked as a paralegal in a law office, was accused of
converting to his own account an amount of $6,000, which belonged to a client. 8 Representing himself at trial, he was convicted of embezzlement. 79
Because he had three prior convictions, he was sentenced to twenty-five
years to life. 8 On appeal, he moved to represent himself based upon
Faretta .
The California Court of Appeal denied his motion based on prior California precedent that had held that there was no constitutional right to represent oneself on appeal." The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
deep split among both the states and the lower federal courts on the issue. 83
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, affirming the denial, with
Kennedy and Breyer filing concurring opinions. Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the result. 4
Distinguishing Faretta,Justice Stevens pointed out that there were significant differences both historically and structurally between the right to
self-representation at trial and on appeal.4" With respect to historical antecedents, he noted first that there was little historical evidence supporting a
right to self-representation on appeal.486 Indeed, there was no right to appeal
at all in a criminal case at common law.487 Moreover, although all states had
some kind of discretionary appellate review, the right to appellate review of
a criminal case was not recognized as a matter of state constitutional law until 1899.488 Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded, in the absence of historical
precedent, and in view of fact that the right to appeal was itself of recent ori-

476. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
477. Martinez, 528 U.S. 152.
478. Id. at 154-55.
479. Id. at 155.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. ld. (citing People v. Scott, 64 Cal. App. 4!h 550 (1998)).
483. Id. at 155. State court decisions in Arkansas, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Texas recognized the right of self-representation on appeal, while California, Florida and Tennessee did
not. The Circuit Courts of Appeal were similarly split. Myers v. Collins, 8 F.3d 249, 252 (5th
Cir. 1993), Chamberlain v. Ericksen, 744 F.2d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1984), and Campbell v.
Blodgett, 940 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1991) recognized the right, while United States v. Gillis, 773
F.2d 549, 560 (4th Cir. 1985), and Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1984) did not.
484. Martinez, 528 U.S. 152.
485. Id. at 156-62.
486. Id. at 156-59.
487. Id. at 159. J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 308-10

(1883).
488. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 159 n.7 (citing Lobsenz, A ConstitutionalRight to an Appeal;
Guardingagainst UnreasonableRisks of Erroneous Conviction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
375, 376 (1985)). Washington was the first state to "constitutionalize" the right of appeal. Id.
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gin, it could not be said that there was any "long-respected right of selfrepresentation on appeal." 4 "
Noting that Faretta was also grounded in part upon a respect for individual autonomy and traditional distrust of lawyers, Justice Stevens observed
that the historical reasons for the suspicion the populace had for lawyers in
the early colonial days, when most lawyers were officers of the Crown "bent
on the conviction of those who opposed the King's prerogatives"' were no
longer present today.49 ' Justice Stevens acknowledged that an indigent appellant might well be skeptical of a lawyer's undivided loyalty when the same
government that is prosecuting him employs his lawyer.4' He also noted that
there are "without question" cases in which counsel's performance is ineffective.' Nevertheless Justice Stevens concluded that the risk of disloyalty
and incompetence was not sufficient today to conclude that due process was
denied by failing to give an appellant the right to self-representation.494
Perhaps recognizing that this negative assessment of the value of the
right to self-representation could be seen as weakening the rationale for
Faretta,Justice Kennedy wrote briefly to express his support for the right to
self-representation at trial.495 Justice Breyer, on the other hand, wrote separately to recognize that trial judges "closer to the firing line have sometimes
expressed dismay about the practical consequences of [Faretta]. ' In the
absence of empirical research that could shed light on how the right of selfrepresentation impacts fairness, however, Justice Breyer observed that the
Court was "not in a position to reconsider the constitutional assumptions that
4'
underlie [Faretta]."
In a chilling concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated simply that there
was no right to self-representation on appeal because there was no constitutional right to appeal.498
VI. DUE PROCESS IN SENTENCING

A. Apprendi v. New Jersey4'
In the last decade, there has been a trend toward creating statutory sentencing enhancements based upon factors that historically have been consid489.
490.
491.
492.
493.

Martinez, 528 U.S. at 159.
Faretta,422 U.S. 806, 826 (1975).
Martinez, 528 U.S. at 156-58.
Id. at 160.
Il at 161.

494. Id.

495. Id.
496. Id. at 164.

497. Idat 164-65.
498. id at 165.
499. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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ered by judges to justify a harsher sentence under the existing range of sentences for the offense. In many cases the codification of these aggravating
factors has resulted in giving the trial judge the discretion to increase the
sentence beyond that which could otherwise be imposed for the underlying
substantive offense committed; yet, the determination as to whether the aggravating factor exists has often remained an issue for the trial judge to decide at the sentence hearing. Apprendi addresses the question of when a trial
judge may make this determination and when due process requires a
sentencing enhancement to be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable
douh little after 2:00 a.m. on December 22, 1994, Apprendi fired several
shots into the home of an African American family that had recently moved
into his all-white neighborhood in Vineland, New Jersey.' Arrested immediately, Apprendi admitted he did the shooting and stated that he did so because he did not want blacks in the neighborhood. 5"
Charged in a twenty-three-count indictment involving other shootings
and various weapons offenses, Apprendi entered into a plea bargain in which
he pled guilty to three counts involving unlawful possession of weapons."
One of these offenses (possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose) was
linked to the December 22 shooting incident.' The maximum punishment
authorized by the legislature for this second degree weapons offense was ten
years.
Under the terms of the plea agreement, the remaining twenty counts
were dismissed.' However, with respect to the December 22 d weapons offense, the plea agreement allowed the state the right to proceed at the sentencing hearing under a hate crimes enhancement statute.5 0 This statute provided that if Apprendi's purpose in committing a crime was to "intimidate an
individual or group... because of [their] race" he would be subject to substantially increased punishment.' With respect to the December 22 weapons offense, to which Apprendi pled guilty, the penalty could be enhanced
upwards to a maximum of twenty years."'
At the sentencing hearing the state introduced evidence to support the
hate crime enhancement?5 9 Apprendi testified that he was not racially moti500. Id at 466.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 469.

503. Id.
504. Il

505. Id.
506. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000).
507. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.

508. Since one of the other offenses Apprendi pled guilty to was also a second degree
offense punishable by 10 years imprisonment, his exposure under the plea agreement, in light
of the possibility of consecutive sentences was also 20 years. However, this fact was deemed
irrelevant by the Court because Apprendi's actual sentence was based upon the use of the enhancement to increase his punishment for the December 22 offense. Id. at 474.
509. Id. at 469.
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vated and fired into the residence because he was intoxicated." ' The trial
judge concluded "by a preponderanceof the evidence" that "the crime was
motivated by racial bias."5 ' As a result of this finding, Apprendi was now,
by virtue of the enhancement statute, subject to a prison sentence of not less
than ten years nor more than twenty years.5"2 The judge sentenced him to
twelve years imprisonment on the December 22"' weapons offense." 3
It was conceded that Apprendi had been adequately advised before he
entered his guilty plea to the original charges. He was also aware that the
state intended to proceed under the separate sentence enhancement statute
and of the potentially heavier sentence that could follow."" Apprendi appealed only the sentence imposed." ' Apprendi argued that the racial motive,
which authorized the harsher sentence, could not be determined by a judge
using the lower standard of proof which applied at a sentencing hearing 6
Instead, he asserted, due process required that this element be formally
charged and resolved at trial by a jury based upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 17
The state reviewing courts upheld the enhancement statute reasoning
that it merely addressed the offender's motive for perpetrating the crime,
which was historically only a sentencing factor and not an element of the offense."' On appeal the U.S. Supreme Court held five to four that the enhancement statute was unconstitutional because racial motive was in effect
an element of the offense for which Apprendi was sentenced.5" 9 Justice Stevens wrote the Court's opinion, which was joined by Justices Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, and Ginsburg. Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion, joined
by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Breyer.
Apprendi continues the examination of enhancement statutes begun by
the Court in Almendarez-Torres v. United States"° and Jones v. United
States." Apprendi's rule, stated in its simplest terms, is that "it is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts which
increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is
510. Il
511. kL (emphasis added).
512. Id.
513. Apprendi received shorter concurrent sentences on the other two charges to which
he pled guilty. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475 n.3 (discussing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
518. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
519. Id.

520. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)
521. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). See Laurence A. Benner et al., Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Review of United States Supreme Court Decisions at the

Close of the Millennium, 36 CAL. W. L. Ray. 437, 492-95 (2000) for a discussion of Jones
and Almendarez-Torres.
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exposed... [S]uch facts must [also] be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."' Hence, because the racial hate motive increased the punishment beyond the maximum for the underlying offense, this fact must be
charged, determined by a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice Stevens justified this requirement on a review of history and
precedent, relying upon In re Winship 523 and Mullaney v. Wilbur." As Justice Stevens explained:
If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an
offense is committed under certain circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense re
heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should not-at the
moment the State is put to proof of those circumstances-be' deprived of
protections which until that point, unquestionably attached." "
In Justice Stevens' view, by adding the new racial motive element (intent to intimidate on the basis of race) to enhance Apprendi's punishment,
the State had created a new "crime." 52 The original underlying weapons offense became, in effect, a lesser-included offense to a hate crime, which had
the added element of racial motive. It would have been an entirely different
matter, Justice Stevens said, if the legislature had merely directed the judge
to consider racial motive as a factor that justified giving a sentence toward
the higher end of the sentencing range-for example a sentence closer to ten
years of incarceration rather than the minimum sentence of five years."' Under this scenario, a new crime would not have been created."
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, chided the majority for exalting form over
substance since a legislature could decree that the maximum punishment was
a range of between five and twenty years for an offense, and then leave it to
judicial discretion to decrease punishment based upon the judge's determination that the defendant had not acted with a racial motive. 29 Justice Stevens responding to this criticism in a lengthy footnote, observed that such a
possibility seemed "remote" since "structural democratic constraints" would
discourage a legislature from exposing all citizens to severe punishment that
would be out of all proportion to the culpability normally attaching to the offence. 3 He also observed that in addition to this "political check on potentially harsh legislative action" any revision of a criminal offense to avoid the
522. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53
(1999)) (Stevens, J., concurring).
523. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
524. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
525. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484.
526. Id. at 486.
527. Id.

528. Id. at 488.
529. Id. at 543.
530. Id. at488n.16.
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requirements of due process would be questioned by the Court. 3' Noting that
there was a difference between facts which aggravate punishment and facts
which mitigate punishment, Justice Stevens emphasized that what counted
was not form, but effect. 32
3 in which the
The majority distinguished McMillan v. Pennsylvania,"
Court upheld a statute requiring a mandatory minimum sentence of five
years if the defendant was found by a preponderance of the evidence to have
visibly possessed a firearm, because the sentence range, which authorized a
maximum sentence of ten-years' incarceration, with or without the aggravating factor, remained the same.534 All that resulted from finding the additional
factor in McMillan was an increase in the minimum sentence, which was already within the range of authorized punishment.
Justice Stevens claimed in a footnote that Apprendi did not overrule
McMillan but only limited it "to cases which do not involve the imposition
of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense estab'
lished by the jury's verdict."535
However, as both the dissent and Justice
Thomas, concurring, point out, the logic of Apprendi would arguably seem
to require a different result since the amount of punishment depends upon a
fact not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. It might be possible to
distinguish Apprendi from McMillan on the ground that Apprendi involved
an intent, or mens rea element, which, as the majority noted, "is more often
than not the sine qua non of a violation of a criminal law."536 However, that
attempt, as the dissent suggests, would also seem to run contrary to Apprendi's logic. Whether an element is based on intent, conduct or the existence of a circumstance or result, should make no difference. The logic of
Apprendi dictates that if the element causes a defendant's punishment to be
increased beyond what it otherwise would have been, then due process requires a determination of that element by a jury based upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. 3
Justice O'Connor's dissent noted that the majority opinion also ignored
Pattersonv. New York."' arguing that Apprendi is inconsistent with that decision.539 In Patterson,the issue involved a New York statute which reduced
second-degree murder to manslaughter if the defense proved that the defen-

531. Id. at 494.

532. Id.
533. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
534. Id.
535. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486 n.13.
536. Id. at 2364 n.18. By contrast, the enhancer in McMillian was arguably a circumstance (the visibility of the weapon). But cf. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. at 340 (striking
down an enhancement based upon a finding of serious bodily injury resulting from a car jacking).
537. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 533.
538. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
539. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 530-31.
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dant killed while under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. 54"
The statute was an expansion of the common law provocation doctrine,
which reduced murder to manslaughter and thus lessened the sentencing
range.' The PattersonCourt upheld shifting the burden of proof to the defendant on the provocation issue.5"
As Justice Stevens pointed out, however, Pattersonis not applicable to
the facts of Apprendi, because it deals with a defense. 3 Provocation is an issue that arises only if the state has first proven all of the elements of the
crime of murder. Provocation, moreover is an affirmative defense and historically it has been permissible to place the burden upon the defendant to
prove the existence of affi-mative defenses. Therefore Pattersonwould seem
to have little to do with sentencing factors which aggravate punishment.
The dissent also argued that Apprendi was inconsistent with Almendarez-Torresv. United States" decided just the previous term. In that case, a
federal statute extended the punishment possible for an offense beyond its
statutory maximum because of the offender's prior criminal record."S The
Supreme Court upheld the enhancement in a five to four decision, because
recidivism had traditionally been a basis for judicial enhancement of a sentence.'
Justice Stevens acknowledged that "it is arguable that AlmendarezTorres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested.' '" 7 However,
Justice Stevens pointed out, the defendant in Almendarez-Torres admitted to
the earlier convictions.S Since the defendant had due process safeguards
with respect to the facts underlying those convictions and admitted to their
existence there was no contested fact requiring the safeguards at issue in Apprendi. 9
In light of Justice Stevens' acknowledgement and Justice Thomas' concurring opinion, it would seem a safe bet that Almendarez-Torres will most
likely be limited to its facts and become an extremely narrow exception to
the Apprendi rule. While joining the Court's opinion, Justice Thomas wrote
separately because he believed that "the Constitution requires a broader rule
than the Court adopts."5 ° Moreover, Justice Thomas confessed that he had
erred in joining the majority in Almendarez-Torres: "[O]ne of the chief er540. N.Y.

PENAL LAW § 125.20(2) (McKinney 1975).
541. Patterson,432 U.S. at 202.
542. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (upholding Oregon's statute placing the
burden of proof for the insanity defense upon the defendant).
543. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 n.12.
544. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. at 239.
545. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (1988)..
546. Almendarez-Torres,523 U.S. at 230.
547. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90 (emphasis added).
548. Id at 488.
549. Id.
550. lId at 499.
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rors of Almendarez-Torres-anerror to which I succumbed-was to attempt
to discover whether a particular fact is traditionally (or typically) a basis for
a sentencing court to increase an offender's sentence."551
Almendarez-Torres was a five to four decision, with Justice Thomas's
vote making the margin of difference. Obviously, if the issue in AlmendarezTorres were to be revisited, the exception for prior convictions would likely
not continue to stand.
For Justice Thomas, Apprendi "turns on the simple question of what
constitutes a 'crime.""'5 He argued that history convincingly demonstrates
that a "crime" includes every fact that forms "the basis for imposing or increasing punishment (in contrast with a fact that mitigates punishment)."5 3
On this view then, any fact used to establish punishment would be covered
by Apprendi's rule requiring the due process safeguards (i.e. jury determination and standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
If Justice Thomas is correct, this throws into doubt not only Almendarez-Torres but also McMillan, and typical (judicially determined) enhancements in drug offenses based upon the quantity of drugs sold or possessed "4 as well as similar enhancements under the federal Sentencing
Guidelines.5' Moreover death penalty statutes such as that previously upheld
in Walton v. Arizona" which direct a judge (rather than a jury) to determine
whether an aggravating circumstance exists, thus making the defendant eligible for death, would also be called into serious question.' Indeed, Justice
O'Connor, in dissent, conceded that in Walton the judge's finding subjected
a defendant to punishment which exceeded the maximum punishment which
could otherwise be imposed on the basis of the jury's verdict. She argued:
If a State can remove from the jury a factual determination that makes the
difference between life and death, as Walton holds that it can, it is inconceivable why a State cannot do the same with respect to a factual determination that results in only a 10 year increase in the maximum sentence to
which a defendant is exposed."'
By the same logic, then, after Apprendi, if a State cannot remove from
the jury a factual determination that results in only a ten year increase in the
maximum sentence to which a defendant is exposed, as Apprendi holds it
cannot, it is inconceivable that a State could do the same with respect to a
factual determination that makes the difference between life and death.
551. Id. at 520.

552. Id. at 499.
553. Id. at 501.
554. See Alan Elllis et al., Apprehending and Appreciating Apprendi, 15 WTR CRIM.
JUsT. 16 (2001) (discussing Apprendi's impact on drug cases).

555. Id. at 18.
556. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
557. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring opinion).
558. Id. at 537 (O'Connor J., dissenting opinion).
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All of this, of course, was foreshadowed in Jones v. United States' 9
where the Court, in striking down an enhancement based upon a judicial determination of serious bodily injury, attempted an elaborate factors analysis
to determine whether an enhancement was an element of the crime or merely
a traditional sentencing factor."6 Justice Thomas is correct. After Apprendi it
is clear that this initial approach has failed. It has failed because of the power
of Apprendi's logic, and that power comes from the clear command of the
Constitution itself. Noting that the dissenters could provide no "coherent alternative" to counter the force of this logic, Justice Scalia astutely summed
up the essence of Apprendi in his concurring opinion:
What ultimately demolishes the case for the dissenters is that they are unable to say what the right to trial by jury does guarantee if, as they assert,
it does not guarantee-what it has assumed to guarantee throughout history7-the right to have a jury determine those facts that determine the
maximum sentence the law allows.... [T]he [jury trial] guarantee ...has
no intelligible content unless it means that all the facts which must exist in
order to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be
found by the jury.56'
Another issue for the future, and one not addressed in the Apprendi decision, is retroactivity. In Teague v. Lane562 the Court held that new rules of
constitutional criminal procedure announced by the United States Supreme
Court will not be applied to cases that became final prior to the announcement of the new rule. 63 In Bousley v. United States,' " however, the Court
specifically held that Teague did not apply to rules of substantive law."u Accordingly, the first question is whether the Apprendi rule is one of substantive or procedural law. It may be argued that Apprendi defines what is a
crime and thus creates a rule of substantive law, not procedure. The procedural aspect arises only because of the substantive result.
If, on the other hand the decision is viewed as procedural, does Apprendi announce a new rule, or does the case solely reiterate what th6'Court
previously held? Moreover, if it is a new rule of procedure, does it fit within
an exception to Teague in that it is the new rule so fundamental to ordered
liberty as to require retroactive application? 5" Justice Stevens' conclusion
that the New Jersey statute constituted an "unacceptable departure from the
jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system '567
would seem to lend weight to the argument that the Court has simply re559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.

Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
See Benner, supra note 520, at 494.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Id. at 310.
Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
Id. at 615.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 314.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.
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turned home to fundamental constitutional principles, which are both ancient
and fundamental.
B. Castillo et al. v. United States568
Castillo was a member of the Branch-Davidians who had been involved
in the deadly confrontation with federal agents at Waco, Texas, in 1993. A
jury convicted Castillo of carrying a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. The type of firearm Castillo possessed was not specified in the
charge, nor presented as an issue for the jury to resolve. The punishment for
this offense, however, depended upon the type of firearm carried. The minimum penalty was five years imprisonment, which increased to ten years if
the weapon was a shotgun, and thirty years if the weapon was a machine
gun.5" At sentencing, the trial judge found the firearm to be a machine-gun
and sentenced Castillo to thirty years' incarceration."0
Castillo argued that the machine-gun allegation was an element of the
crime and had to be tried as a jury issue and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Breyer,
agreed with the defendant and reversed and remanded the conviction.'
Instead of engaging in an Apprendi2 analysis, however, the Court resolved the case through statutory construction, holding that Congress intended the type of firearm to be an element of the crime. 3 Justice Breyer arrived at this conclusion based upon several factors. First the overall structure
of the statute suggested that Congress intended that the type of firearm
should be an element of the crime because the word "machine gun" was in
the same sentence as the operative element "uses or carries" and was not
separated from the main body of the offense by dashes or subsection&
Second, firearm types were not a typical or traditional basis for enhancing a
sentence." Third, there was no unfairness to the government in having a
jury. determine this factual issue. 6 Finally, the severity of the penalty further
persuaded the Court that Congress intended the issue to be one for the jury."

568. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000).

569. The statute creating the offense provided: "Whoever, during and in relation s to any
crime of violence.., uses or caries a firearm, shall... be sentenced to imprisonment for five
years, and if the firearm is a ... machine gun.. .to imprisonment for thirty years. 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) (1) (1988 & Supp. V).
570. Castillo, 530 U.S. at 122..
571. Id. at 131.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.

See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Castillo, 530 U.S. at 124.
Id. at 124-25.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 127-28.

577. Id. at 131.
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Castillo thus carries on the factors approach initiated in Jones v. United
States78 to determine legislative intent. Where the legislature intends that a
fact shall serve only as a sentencing factor and does not provide for jury determination based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Apprendi will
govern whether such a provision is constitutionally permissible.
VII. IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION

A. Ohler v. United Statess 9
Defendant Maria Ohler attempted to cross the border from Mexico into
San Diego in a van carrying eighty-one pounds of marijuana. In a federal
prosecution for importation and possession of marijuana, the prosecution
filed a successful pre-trial motion, which secured the right to impeach the
defendant with her prior conviction for possession of methamphetamine.
When defendant testified at trial, she preempted the prosecutor's impeachment by admitting to the prior conviction on direct examination. With respect to the current offense, defendant claimed that she had gone to Mexico
to retrieve her van and denied having any knowledge that there was marijuana hidden there."8
On appeal from her conviction, defendant maintained that the pre-trial
motion permitting impeachment had been improperly granted. The Ninth
Circuit held, however, that she had waived her objection by revealing the
prior conviction during her direct testimony."'
In the Supreme Court defendant argued that it was unfair to require her
to have to wait to disclose her prior convictions until she was under crossexamination. She pointed out that unless she was allowed to bring out the
prior convictions during her direct examination, the jury would think that she
was being deceitful in not revealing them and thus might discredit her testimony even more than would otherwise be the case."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-member majority, affirmed
the Ninth Circuit on the principle that a person "introducing evidence cannot
complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted." ' Observing that "both the Government and the defendant in a criminal trial must
make choices as the trial progresses,"5" the Chief Justice postulated a hypothetical situation in which the defendant's testimony might be so unbeliev-

578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.

See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
520 U.S. 753 (2000).
Id. at 754-55.
169 F.3d 1200, 1204.
520 U.S. at 757.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 757.
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able that a prosecutor might elect not to impeach with a contested prior conviction in order to avoid making it an issue on appeal."
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and
Breyer, found that neither precedent nor principle supported the majority's
waiver rule.5 ' Justice Souter argued that the majority had given prosecutors
an unjustified tactical advantage by allowing a prosecutor on crossexamination to create "an impression of current deceit by concealment"
which could affect the jury's assessment of a defendant's testimony, since
they would blame the defendant for not being forthcoming." '
In light of Justice Souter's conclusion that this prosecution tactic is "antithetical to dispassionate fact finding"5 8 and can improperly influence a
jury's evaluation of a defendant's credibility," 9 it can be argued that in such
cases defense counsel should be given broad latitude on voir dire to explore
juror attitudes regarding prior convictions. It might be countered that this inquiry by defense counsel could itself be construed as a waiver under Ohler.
Extending Ohler that far, however, would not be justified by the logic of the
opinion, which is based upon the admission of evidence. Nor would it seem
fair to prevent defense counsel from attempting to secure their client's right
to an impartial jury when confronted with an admittedly misleading prosecutorial tactic.
VIII. ATrORNEY WAIVER OF STATUTORY RIGHTS
A. New York v. Hill5"
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that defense counsel's
agreement to a trial date beyond the deadline required by the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers59' waived his client's speedy trial rights under that
statute.59
a
The defendant had been in custody in Ohio when New York lodged 593
detainer against him under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD).
Under the provisions of the LAD, once the defendant signed a request for
disposition (which he had in this case), the requesting state had 180 days to

585. Id at 757-58.
586. Id at 763.
587. Id. at 764.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. 528 U.S. 110 (2000).
591. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1970). "The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (lAD) is a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish
procedures for the resolution of one State's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another
state." 528 U.S. at 111.
592. 528 U.S. at 118.
593. Id. at 112.
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bring him to trial.59' Without the defendant being present, his lawyer agreed
to a court date outside that time. Seven days after the time had run, the defendant moved to dismiss.595 His motion was denied by the trial court, which
concluded that defense counsel's agreement to the trial date constituted a
waiver of the defendant's rights under the IAD 96 The New York Court of
Appeals reversed reasoning that defense counsel's mere acquiescence in accepting the date should not constitute waiver because it was not an affirmative act, like seeking a continuance. 97
Justice Scalia, speaking for a unanimous court, reversed the New York
Court of Appeals and reinstated defendant's second-degree murder conviction, holding that the defendant was bound by the lawyer's agreement to the
trial date.598 Justice Scalia noted that while "there were basic rights that [an]
attorney cannot waive without the [client's] fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent..., the lawyer.., must have-full authority to manage
the conduct of the trial."'" Justice Scalia disagreed with the New York high
court's conclusion that waiver required an affirmative act, stating that under
such a rule defendants could accept treatment inconsistent with IAD requirements and then recant.' Given this potential for abuse, and the harshness of the sanction for violating the IAD 180 day rule (dismissal with
prejudice) Justice Scalia rejected the distinction between active and passive
waiver as "hypertechnical. ''w°
IX. Ex POST FACTO LAWS
A. Carmell v. Texas'
In Carmell the Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether an
amended Texas statute allowing conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim alone, was an ex post facto law, when at the
time of the commission of the offense, the law required corroboration. The
Court held that such a conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution. ' 3
Carmell was indicted on fifteen counts of sexual offenses against his
stepdaughter, who was thirteen at the commencement of the abuse. The acts
594. Id.
595. ld. at 113.

596. People v. Reid, 627 N.Y.S.2d 234, 237 (1995).
597. People v. Hill, 704 N.E.2d 542, 546 (1998).
598. 528 U.S. at 118.
599. Id. at 114-15 (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,417-18 (1988)).
600. 528 U.S. at 118.
601. Id.
602. 529 U.S 513 (2000).
603. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The Constitution provides that "No State shall ... pass
any... ex post facto Law ..."Id.
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occurred between 1991 and 1995.' The victim did not report the abuse until
1995. Carmell was convicted on two counts of aggravated sexual assault, five
counts of sexual assault, and eight counts of indecency with a minor. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment on the two counts of aggravated sexual assault
and given concurrent twenty year sentences on the other offenses.'
Prior to 1993, a Texas statute provided that a sexual assault victim's uncorroborated testimony was insufficient to support a criminal conviction as a matter of law. One form of corroboration, known as "outcry," permitted conviction
on the victim's testimony alone if the victim had informed another person of
the sexual assault within six months of its occurrence.' An exception was also
made to the corroboration requirement if the victim was less than fourteen
years of age at the time of the alleged offense.'
Because Carmell's stepdaughter was fourteen or older at the time most of
the offenses were committed, this statutory rule of evidence thus precluded
conviction in the absence of either "outcry" or some other form of corroboration. However, in 1993, the Texas statute was amended to expand the exception
to the corroboration requirement. Under the amendment, convictions could
now be based upon the uncorroborated testimony of victims who were under
eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense. Carmell was tried under
this amended rule of evidence.
On direct review, Carmell appealed four of his convictions (charging offenses committed between 1992 and 1993) on the ground that the application of
the amended statute to these offenses violated the Ex Pose Facto Clause."
Carmell argued that as to those charges the pre-1993 version of the statute
should have been applied. Under the pre-1993 version of the statute, the State
would not have been able to present the required quantum of evidence, because
the allegations were based on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, and
the victim neither made a timely outcry nor was under fourteen years old at the
time of the offenses.
The Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas rejected Carmell's
expostfacto argument, holding that the retroactive application of the amended
statute to Cannell's case did not constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause.' The court reasoned that the amended law was a rule of procedure that
"merely 'remove[d] existing restrictions upon the competency of certain classes
of persons as witnesses."'61°
The United States Supreme Court reversed in a five to four decision. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, began by giving a detailed historical account of the constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws, starting with
604. 529 U.S. at 554.
605. Id. at 517.
606. TEx.CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.07 (2000).

607. Id.
608. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
609. 963 S.W. 2d 833, 836 (1998) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884)).
610. Id.
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the opinion of Justice Chase in Calderv. Bull.6 According to Justice Chase, ex
postfacto'laws fell into four categories:
1'. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d.
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
4 Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony than the law requiredat the time of the commission of
the offence, in order to convict the offender.

As Stevens explained, Carmell's case fell into the fourth category discussed by Justice Chase. Observing that Chase relied heavily upon the work of
the common law scholar Richard Wooddeson, Justice Stevens pointed out that
both Wooddeson and Chase had cited the English case of Sir John Fenwick as
an example of an ex post facto law falling into the fourth category. "' Justice
Stevens described Fenwick's case in detail because he found it to be very similar to Carmell's.61
In 1688, William Im deposed James H and became King of England. In
1695, following the death of Queen Mary, Sir John Fenwick participated in a
conspiracy to overthrow King William and restore James to the throne." 5 Included in the group were George Porter and Cardell Goodman. However, before the group could carry out their scheme, several members of the conspiracy
told King William of the plot and everyone was arrested except Fenwick, who
went into hiding. At the time, the law of England provided that the testimony of
at least two witnesses was required to prove the crime of high treason."6
It soon became apparent during the trials of those conspirators apprehended that only Porter and Goodman could implicate Fenwick. Fenwick decided to try to bribe these witnesses to avoid conviction. He began by offering
Porter a bribe through one of his agents, which Porter accepted. However, hoping to gain favor with King William, Porter turned in Fenwick's agent and testified against Fenwick before the Grand Jury. Undaunted, Fenwick asked his
wife to try to bribe Goodman. She authorized her agent to offer Goodman
money if he left the country or certain death if he did not accept. Faced with an
offer he could not refuse, Goodman took the money and fled to France." 7 Upon
discovering Fenwick's ruse, the House of Commons amidst much debate conceming its propriety, passed a Bill of Attainder against Fenwick notwithstand611. 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
612. Id. (emphasis added).
613. 529 U.S. at 526.
614. Id. at 526-27.
615. Id. at 526 (citing 4 MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 406-07 (1899)).

616. Id. at 526-27 (citing An Act for Regulating of Trials in Cases of Treason and misprision of Treason, 7 & 8 Will. III, ch. 3 § 2 (1695-96), in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 6 (reprint 1963)).
617. Id. at 528 n. 16 (citing 4 MACAuLAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 495-512 (1899)).
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ing the two-witness rule. The bill was subsequently passed by the House of
Lords and assented to by the King." ' Fenwick was finally beheaded on January
28, 1697.19
Because Fenwick's case was historically held to be the paradigm of an ex
postfacto law in the fourth category, Justice Stevens compared the conviction
of Carmell to the attainder of Fenwick. He noted first that Fenwick was convicted by the House of Commons on less evidence than was required when the
act of alleged treason was committed (i.e. he was convicted on the testimony of
one witness, when two witnesses were required at the time of the commission
of the treason). Similarly, Carmell was convicted on less evidence than would
have been sufficient at the time his offenses were committed.62 Justice Stevens
therefore concluded that Carmell's conviction violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented. They agreed with the Texas state court that the
amended Texas statute was a procedural rule defining witness competency
rather than a substantive rule, which determined the sufficiency of the evidence
for conviction.62' Instead of focusing on English history, Justice Ginsburg focused on the history of Texas, beginning with the observation that a seduced
female had historically been deemed an incompetent witness as a matter of
Texas law.' r While this disability was removed by statute in 1911, a corroboration requirement was nevertheless imposed.6' Referring to the corroboration
requirement as "outmoded" because sexual assault victims are no more likely
to fabricate testimony than victims of other crimes for which no corroboration
is required, Justice Ginsburg noted most states no longer require it. Nevertheless, she pointed out, the historical development of the Texas statute at issue
"reveals a progressive alleviation of restrictions on the competency of victim
testimony, not a legislative emphasis on the quantum of evidence needed to
convict."
Relying upon Hopt v. Territory of Utah,6' Justice Ginsburg then pointed
out that witness competency rules have been upheld when applied to offenses
618. Id. at 530 (citing An Act to Attaint Sir John Fenwick Baronet of High Treason, 8 Will.
IM,ch. 4 (1696)).
619. Id. at 530 (citing 4 MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 526-34 (1899)). This method
of proceeding, whereby capital punishment is imposed by a special act of the legislature
(called a Bill of Attainder) without recourse to proper judicial proceedings, is of course also
prohibited by Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution.
620. Carmell, like Fenwick, was convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, the victim of his alleged sexual assaults. Yet, at the time the offenses at issue were committed, the law required corroboration because the victim was above the age of fourteen. Thus like
Fenwick's case, a second witness (reporting the victim's "outcry") or some other form of corroboration, was necessary for a valid conviction at the time that Carmell's offenses were committed.

621. Id. at 553.
622. Id. at 520-21.
623. Id (citing Tex. Rev. Crim. Stat. tit. 8, ch.7, art. 789) (1911).

624. Id.
625. 110 U.S. 574 (1884)
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committed before their enactment.626 In Hopt, a statute in effect at the time the
defendant committed his offense provided that felons were incompetent to testify.627 Prior to defendant's trial, that statute was repealed, and the State introduced the testimony of a felon to convict Hopt of capital murder. The defendant argued that allowing the felon to testify at his trial was a violation of his
rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that the repeal "simply enlarge[d] the class of persons who may be competent
to testify in criminal cases. 6 2' Likewise, Justice Ginsburg argued, the amendment to the Texas statute was merely an enlargement of the class of persons
competent to testify. In this case the class of victims deemed competent to testify without corroboration was expanded to include victims up to eighteen years
of age.629
In response to the argument that the Texas statute was merely a "witness
competency" rule, the majority countered that a teenage victim of sexual assault was always "competent" to testify both before and after the amendment to
the Texas statute. Therefore the amendment neither enlarged the class of persons competent to testify nor removed any restriction on the competency of any
witness to testify.63 What changed as a result of the amendment was the sufficiency of the evidence needed to convict, and this the majority argued could not
be applied retroactively without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.
This counter-argument, Justice Ginsburg replied, valued form over substance. Although it was true that a child aged fourteen to eighteen was allowed
to testify in a technical sense prior to 1993, this technical fact ignored the reality that the child's testimony could not be considered by the jury for the purposes of conviction in the absence of corroboration. Thus the child's testimony
was not really "competent" because "[e]vidence to which the jury is not permitted to assign weight is, in reality, incompetent evidence."631
The dissent then argued that neither of the twin purposes underlying the Ex
Post Facto Clause were served by applying it to Carmell's case. The first purpose of the clause, Justice Ginsburg argued, was "to assure that legislative Acts
give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning
' Clearly, Ginsburg
until explicitly changed."632
said, Carmell knew his behavior
was illegal, and nothing in the record suggested that it was impossible for his
victim to report the sexual abuse to another person, so he could not have reasonably relied upon the "outcry" period.633 Therefore neither notice nor reliance
were implicated in this case.

626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.

529 U.S at 553.
110 U.S. at 577-78.
529 U.S. at 571 (citing Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589 (1884)).
Id. at 554-55.
Id. at 544-45.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 566 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981)).
Id. at 566-67.
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The second purpose of the clause was to "restrict governmental power by
restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." This purpose, Justice Ginsburg noted, had to do with the separation of powers and reflected the
concern that legislatures should not "meddle with the judiciary's task of adjudicating guilt and innocence in individual cases." Here, there was no suggestion
that Carmell was singled out by the Texas legislature for special treatment.
Therefore, the dissent argued, since neither purpose of the Ex Post Facto
Clause was served by applying it to the case at bar, it should not be stretched to
apply to a statute that was attempting to make progressive reforms with respect
to the methods of proving a case.635
The majority's refusal in Carmell to permit an exception to the historical
understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause, even in the face of Justice Ginsburg's eloquent argument, demonstrates the Clause's continued vitality as a
"bulwark in favour of the personal security of the subject"' 636 against the dangers
of governmental abuse. ' As Justice Stevens noted, the burden imposed by the
Ex Post Facto Clause is modest. Nothing in the Clause prohibits prospective
application of an amended statute. If the law existing at the time of the offense
did not punish the offender, then his escape from punishment "can never produce [as] much harm to the community, as may arise from the infraction of a
rule, upon which the purity of public justice and the existence of civil liberty,
essentially depend. '3s
As Justice Ginsburg warned, however, Carmell also places a shadow over
any evidentiary rule change "that work[s] to the defendant's detriment." 9 Attempting to head off this criticism, Justice Stevens asserted:
We do not mean to say that every rule change that has an effect on
whether a defendant can be convicted implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Ordinary rules of evidence, for example, do not violate the Clause....
Rules of that nature are ordinarily evenhanded, in the sense that they may
benefit either the State or the defendant in any given case. More crucially,
such rules, by simply permitting evidence to be admitted at trial, do not at
all subvert the presumption of innocence, because they do not concern
whether the admissible evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption.
Even with this caveat, however, the door would seem to have been opened
to permit a challenge to any change in an evidentiary rule that arguably makes a
634. Id. at 566 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)).
635. Id. at 567.

636. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. at 386, 390 (1798).
637. 529 U.S. at 553-74. Justice Scalia, who perhaps was not immune to Justice Stevens'

appeal to history, joined the majority opinion without comment.

638. Id. at 553 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1338,

at 211 n.2 (1833)).
639. Id. at 562. Justice Ginsburg, postulated, for example, the enactment of a new exception to the rule against hearsay, which now made evidence admissible that had previously
been excluded at the time of the commission of the offense. Id.
640. Id. at 533 n.23.
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defendant's conviction depend on less evidence that it did at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense.
X. CONCLUSION

In its first full term of the new millennium, the Supreme Court charted a
moderate course as it attempted to mediate the tension between individual
rights and the pressures generated by the criminal justice system's need for
flexibility in law enforcement and finality regarding convictions. The Court
reaffirmed basic constitutional protections under the Fourth Amendment in
Flippo v. West Virginia (no crime scene exception to the warrant requirement), Bond v. United States (squeezing luggage constitutes a search), and
Floridav. J.L. (rejecting anonymous tip as basis for reasonable suspicion). It
also preserved Fifth Amendment protections in Dickerson v. United States
(rejecting Congress' attempt to overrule Miranda) and United States v. Hubbell (allowing derivative use immunity). The Court also halted the recent
erosion of fundamental due process rights in sentencing in Apprendi v. New
Jersey (right to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt apply to sentencing enhancements which increase maximum punishment) and sustained
the Ex Post Facto Clause in Carmell v. Texas (invalidating conviction obtained on less evidence than law required at time of offense).
At the same time the Court also gave an assist to the police in Illinois v.
Wardlow (flight from police in a high crime area gives officer reasonable
suspicion to stop) and permitted tactical advantages for prosecutors in Portuondo v. Agard (closing argument) and Ohler v. United States (impeachment with prior convictions).
One trend emerging from this term's decisions is seen in the Court's
concern with ineffective assistance of counsel. Almost one quarter of its
cases involved either claims of ineffective assistance or failures on the part
of defense counsel that worked to the detriment of their client's rights. In
Terry Williams v. Taylor the Court seemed to send a clear signal that the
Strickland standard can no longer be used to whitewash such failures, finding that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present
mitigating evidence at a capital sentencing hearing.
On the other hand, in Roe v. Flores-Ortegathe Court held that defense
counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal after a guilty plea was not per se
ineffectiveness of counsel, but must be assessed under a 'totality of the circumstances" analysis. In Edwards v. Carpenterthe Court also held that an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not serve as "cause" for the
procedural default of a substantive claim unless the ineffectiveness claim itself had been properly preserved.
Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of the term was the Court's
"hands off" approach to issues involving jury instructions in death penalty
cases. In Weeks v. Angelone the Court continued to embrace the presumption
that a jury reads and applies all jury instructions together, even where objechttps://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss2/3
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tive evidence indicated that the jury was confused and improperly focused
on just one ambiguous instruction. The freakish imposition of the death penalty was also demonstrated in Ramdass v. Angelone where the Court refused
to require that a jury be adequately informed about the likelihood of defendant's parole eligibility-a consideration that post-trial interviews indicated
would have influenced at least three members of the jury to spare his life.
The Court also severely cut back on the autonomy of defendants, declaring in Martinez v. California that there is no right to self-representation on
appeal and casting perhaps some doubt on the continuing viability of the
right to self-representation at trial. At the same time the Court held in New
York v. Hill that defense counsel must have full authority to manage the conduct of the trial stage and could therefore, without defendant's knowledge or
consent, waive statutory speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers.
Finally the Court clarified and modified the harshness of some of the
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) that placed dramatic restrictions on federal habeas corpus review.
In Slack v. McDaniel, the court held that a subsequent habeas petition, filed
after an initial petition had been dismissed without adjudication on the merits because of the failure to exhaust state remedies, was not a "second or successive" petition subject to dismissal under the abuse of writ doctrine. The
Court also modified AEDPA's bar on evidentiary hearings in federal court,
holding in Michael Williams v. Taylor that where a habeas petitioner failed
to develop a factual basis for a claim in state court, an evidentiary hearing
would still be permitted if counsel was diligent, but had been precluded by
circumstances or misconduct from timely development of a factual basis in
state court proceedings. In Terry Williams v. Taylor, however, the Court restricted habeas relief by requiring that deference be given on habeas review
to state court determinations of constitutional law. Interpreting 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1), the Court held that federal habeas relief cannot be granted simply because a federal court thinks the state court decision was incorrect. Habeas relief is appropriate only if the state court decision is contrary to clearly
established Supreme Court precedent or constitutes an unreasonable factual
application of a correct rule of law.
For the practitioner or academic looking for answers to the persistent
problems confronting our criminal justice system on a daily basis, this term
offered only scant solace. Cases like Apprendi, Terry Williams and Carmell

have spawned more questions than answers. The Court also still seems blind
to the failure of its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to address the problem
of racial profiling, as demonstrated by its decision in Illinois v. Wardlow,
which ignored the implications of that practice. Yet perhaps the most significant observation that can be made about this term is that the Rehnquist
Court, known to prefer a balance that favors law and order, held the line, to a
large extent, against repeated attempts to whittle away at basic constitutional
liberties.
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